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Many of the fusion centers recognized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
have established a liaison officer program with the intent of sharing information. In 
Arizona, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center’s Terrorism Liaison Officer 
(TLO) Program has become an institution that is relied upon by participant jurisdictions 
for intelligence and information sharing between federal, state and local governments, 
along with unifying critical infrastructure initiatives and responding to major events. The 
network provides professional and vetted-out partners throughout the public safety 
community to assist jurisdictions in addressing many high-risk events and incidents. In 
the Phoenix urban area, TLOs respond to moderate and large scenes to support incident 
commanders with critical infrastructure data, a law enforcement intelligence research 
capability and a fire/emergency medical service/hazardous materials coordination 
capability that did not exist prior to the TLO program’s establishment. The Arizona 
Counter Terrorism Information Center’s TLO program can serve as a model for fusion 
centers by demonstrating how multilayered and multijurisdictional relationships can be 
leveraged into a comprehensive network to address complex issues. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many fusion centers, as recognized by United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), have established a liaison officer program to share information. Many 
fusion centers will host liaisons from their participant jurisdictions for a one-day class to 
instruct the liaisons on the current threat environment and further instruct them on how to 
send homeland security related information to the fusion center. Many times this 
deteriorates into a seldom used email exchange system.  
Arizona’s fusion center, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(ACTIC), is recognized by DHS as Arizona’s only fusion center. ACTIC’s participating 
jurisdictions send selected members of their public safety staff to be trained and equipped 
as liaison officers by the ACTIC. This training includes instruction in the fusion center 
network along with the capacities and capabilities of the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 
Program. Uniting these jurisdictions in a liaison officer programs that are managed at the 
fusion center allows jurisdictions the information, guidance, and network necessary to 
address many of their homeland security related needs.  
In Arizona, the ACTIC’s TLO Program has become an institution relied upon by 
participant jurisdictions for intelligence and information sharing between federal, state, 
and local governments along with unifying critical infrastructure initiatives and 
responding to major events. The network provides professional and vetted partners 
throughout the public safety community to assist jurisdictions in addressing many high 
risk events and incidents. In the Phoenix urban area, the TLOs respond to moderate and 
large scenes to support incident commanders with critical infrastructure data, law 
enforcement intelligence research capability, and a fire / emergency medical service 
(EMS) / hazardous materials (HazMat) coordination capability that did not exist prior to 
the TLO Programs’ establishment.  
 1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center serve as a national 
model for liaison officer programs?  
C. METHOD 
This thesis is a case study of the ACTIC TLO Program. The case study method is 
defined by Yin as “an empirical inquiry about contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a ‘case’), 
set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”1  
There is limited direction from national fusion center leadership and limited 
consistency between liaison officer programs that have been implemented by DHS 
recognized fusion centers. This case study will demonstrate how a specific liaison officer 
program is being leveraged by a fusion center to address a majority of its basic functions 
through a unified and trained cadre of public safety participants called TLOs. These 
TLOs efforts are consolidated to support their home jurisdiction along with ACTIC’s 
intelligence and information sharing, critical infrastructure protection and on scene 
response. Fusion centers can select from these compartments to build a model that meets 
their needs in achieving their baseline capabilities.  
Baseline capabilities for fusion centers are produced to ensure that state and major 
urban area fusion centers are able to perform the basic functions of a fusion center. These 
basic functions include “…operational capabilities such as Suspicious Activity Reporting 
(SAR; Alerts, Warnings and Notifications; Risk Assessments; and Situational Awareness 
Reporting.”2 DHS and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) conduct 
assessments of fusion centers to identify if they meet the baseline capability. These 
assessment areas are used in this thesis to demonstrate how TLOs are leveraged by the 
1 Robert K. Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 18.  
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the 
Fusion Center Guidelines. Supplement (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008), 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_hsgp_fusion.pdf, 20. 
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ACTIC to help it achieve its baseline capabilities. Since there is a lack of direction for 
fusion centers concerning establishing, managing and growing liaison officer programs 
there is limited consistency This can be used as a model for fusion centers that need to 
achieve their baseline capabilities and to operate as a fusion center.  
The ACTIC’s TLO Program represents a federal, state, tribal, and local partner 
capabilities that move a fusion center from attempting to achieve a baseline capability to 
a mature one that addresses a majority of its baseline capabilities. This program illustrates 
a liaison officer format that can be used by any fusion center.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 9/11 Commission report provides a number of recommendations. A 
significant recommendation refers to information sharing. According to the report, 
“Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance 
between security and shared knowledge.”3 The report further details issues with the 
“Command and Control within First Responder Agencies” and “Lack of Coordination 
among First Responder Agencies.”4 Furthermore, the report explains,  
The lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be stated simply: 
in the new age of terror, they-we are the primary targets. The losses 
America suffered that day demonstrated both the gravity of the terrorist 
threat and the commensurate need to prepare ourselves to meet it. The first 
responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11. 
Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be 
prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the 
front lines. We must plan for that eventuality.5 
According to the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, fusion centers 
can be effective and efficient information sharing and collaboration mechanisms.6 
Lieutenant McGhee of the Aurora, Colorado Police Department addressed the 
collaborative effort when he said, “those working in the federal government and the 
3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 417.  
4 Ibid., 319, 321.  
5 Ibid., 323.  
6 DHS, and DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities, 39, 48. 
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intelligence community have a limited understanding of how SLTTP entities operate and 
what they can offer.”7 Fusion centers receive information from a variety of sources, 
including federal, state, and local entities, and ensure timely and relevant information is 
provided to the right stakeholders within their geographic area of responsibility. 
Lieutenant McGhee went on to say, “because of the newly created relationships between 
the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector entities 
[SLTTP], as well as steady advancements in technology, complicated issues have arisen 
in gathering date.”8 Furthermore, the Fusion Center Guidelines describe the need for 
fusion centers to operate with a consistent framework acknowledging that each center 
will be unique.9 The federal government uses fusion centers as the primary focal points 
within the state and local environments for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related 
information. In addition, federal agencies provide terrorism-related information to state, 
local, and tribal authorities primarily through these fusion centers, which may further 
customize such information for dissemination to satisfy intra- or interstate needs.10 
Fusion involves turning information and intelligence into actionable knowledge.11 
A fusion center is defined by DHS as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 
provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing 
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist 
activity.”12 
Fusion centers have guidelines and baseline capabilities provided to them by the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Global Information 
7 Sam McGhee, “Impacting the Evolution of Information Sharing in the Post-9-/11 United States,” The 




9 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf, 3. 
10 U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: 2009 National Fusion Center Conference (Washington, 
DC: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., 2009).  
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet, August 6, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1296484657738.shtm 
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Sharing Initiative. These guidelines provide them the basic direction they need to 
succeed. The capabilities in the guidelines include coordination, risk assessments, 
suspicious activity reporting, alerts and warnings, situational awareness and coordination 
with response and recovery officials.13 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Fusion Center Guidelines describes 
the need for fusion centers to operate with a consistent framework acknowledging that 
each center will be unique.14 The federal government uses fusion centers as the primary 
focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt and sharing of 
terrorism-related information. Federal agencies provide terrorism-related information to 
state, local, and tribal authorities primarily through these fusion centers, which may 
further customize such information for dissemination to satisfy intra- or interstate 
needs.15  
In September of 2011, Secretary Janet Napolitano explained,  
We now have the 72 fusion centers. We’ve moved our own analysts into 
the fusion centers themselves so that they can help not only with the 
gathering and receipt of information but with the analysis of information. 
And that itself is helpful. If you look at Zazi and you look at Faisal 
Shahzad and you look at Pauline-Ramirez, who was connected with Jihad 
Jane, in all of those cases you would see fusion center activity that was 
very, very helpful. And indeed, these past three days and ongoing, with the 
ongoing threat that has been described to you, fusion centers are active in 
that as well.16  
Lieutenant McGhee recently commented on the national network of fusion 
centers:  
Today fusion centers range in size and capability, but the 78 centers across 
the United States compose the National Network of Fusion Centers 
[NNFC or the National Network], which has become a powerful entity 
13 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines; DHS, and DOJ Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano to the National Fusion Center 
Conference in Kansas City, Mo. on March 11, 2009,” March 13, 2009, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/03/13/napolitanos-remarks-national-fusion-center-conference 
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connecting essential partners from state and local law enforcement 
agencies, federal partners, fire and emergency medical services, public 
health departments, emergency management offices, and private sector 
entities.17 
U.S. DHS has placed intelligence and analysis personnel at fusion centers. The 
Federal Fusion Center Initiative has deployed hundreds of DHS and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) personnel to assist fusion centers in blending law enforcement and 
intelligence information analyses along with coordinating security measures to reduce 
threats in local communities. The assignment of these federal personnel to fusion centers 
helps to integrate capabilities by co-locating resources.18 When a local incident generates 
an impact nationally, it becomes necessary to communicate across many levels of 
government. An established network is beneficial to communicate seamlessly across 
intergovernmental lines. Fusion centers provide a standardized relationship between their 
constituent jurisdictions and the Department of Homeland Security. This can be 
important in day-to-day operations and can be especially important when a 
communication loop needs to be established between DHS and the state, county or local 
police chief, emergency manager, fire chief, or public health officer for an expanding 
incident. This institutionalized relationship is also important when DHS has information 
about indicators, watches, and warnings of hazards that it needs to get into the hands of 
its state and local partners.19 The TLO network can institutionalize the information 
sharing environments communication loop between constituent members of the fusion 
center network, the fusion centers, and their DHS partners.20 In addition, repetitive use of 
this communication loop creates a standardized information sharing environment. 
However, Michael Price from the Brennen Center for Justice cautions, “… the standards 
17 McGhee, “Impacting the Evolution of Information Sharing.” 
18 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Information Sharing Environment, Annual 
Report to Congress, June 2011, 
http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE_Annual_Report_to_Congress_2011.pdf 
19 Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 
2011–Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ia-fy2011-fy2018-strategic-plan.pdf, 9–11  
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Information Sharing Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_information_sharing_strategy.pdf, 6.  
 6 
                                                 
for collecting and disseminating that information are so lax and variable that they not 
only endanger civil liberties, but risk hobbling the entire enterprise.”21  
The Department of Homeland Security encourages fusion centers to create TLO 
programs. In 2010, 23 percent of the 72 fusion centers in the U.S. had Terrorism, 
Intelligence, or Fusion Liaison Officer Program.22 In March of 2008, the ACTIC was 
awarded the National Fusion Center Conference Partners’ Award of Excellence in 
recognition of achievements in 2007—for its outstanding Terrorism Liaison Officer 
Program and overall contribution to the national network of fusion centers.23 
The Fusion Center Guidelines describe what needs to be addressed by fusion 
centers but does not provide direction concerning the personnel, network, or capabilities 
that are necessary to do this work. The personnel and networks that the information 
sharing environment requires are present across the federalist system including federal, 
state, regional, and local partners. The capability to unite these personnel and networks is 
fusion. Some partners may operate seamlessly while others may never have contact until 
there is an emergency. In other words, the gap may not be between the fusion center and 
their federal partners. The gap may be between the federal partners, fusion centers, and 
their counties and cities. 
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated,  
Fusion centers, which I think are a great step forward, something that 
didn’t exist 10 years ago and there are now some 72 of them. And very 
candidly, some are much better than others. I’ve visited some that I think 
are extremely capable. There is a federal nexus to ensure that 
21 Michael Price, National Security and Local Police, Brennan Center For Justice, 2013, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf, 23.  
22 Thomas J. Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First 
Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=16026 
23 National Fusion Center Partners, Award of Excellence (Washington, DC: National Fusion Center 
Partners, 2008). 
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appropriately designated information is shared quickly with state and local 
officials.”24  
TLO programs like the ones in Arizona and Colorado are important to their fusion 
center’s success. In 2010, the CIAC was named Fusion Center of the Year. The center’s 
Director, Major Steve Garcia said “at the heart of CIAC is the Terrorism Liaison Officer 
program.”25  
Benefits of a fusion liaison officer may include improved crime and terrorism 
prevention, force multiplication, improved efficiency of existing resources, informed 
decision making, and increased situational awareness. The TLO concept is a flexible and 
scalable model with a wide and deep information sharing network. This creates increased 
opportunities for identifying issues of which the fusion center wants and needs to be 
aware.26 
Fusion center baseline capability assessments have provided the foundational 
standard for what centers need to achieve. The question becomes who supports the fusion 
centers needs in the regions and jurisdictions that the fusion center is responsible for? The 
National Network of fusion Centers addressed this by stating “By expanding fusion 
centers’ networks, FLO programs enable the National Network to grow stronger, broader, 
and deeper.”27 The TLO program gives the fusion center and its partner jurisdictions the 
link between entities to share information and capabilities. Trained TLOs will know what 
the fusion center requires. These TLOs will be provided the fusion center information and 
intelligence products to review and distribute to their jurisdiction. The question of “who” 
24 Hearing by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence & House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (2011) (testimony of James R. Clapper), 
https://nfcausa.org/(X(1)S(yczd1ejdufegzvtuswlko1je))/ScreenPrintInfoPage.aspx?menuitemid=158&menu
subid=0 
25 Matthew Harwood, “A Model of Intelligence Sharing,” Security Management, April 1, 2012, 
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/A-Model-of-Intelligence-Sharing.aspx  
26 Kevin Saupp, “Fusion Liaison Officer Programs: Effective Sharing of Information to Prevent Crime 
and Terrorism,” The Police Chief Magazine, February 2010, 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2013&issue
_id=22010 
27 National Network of Fusion Centers, 2014–2017 National Strategy for the National Network of 




                                                 
are the members of the ISE and “who” will exchange the information that the fusion 
centers requires to fulfill its baseline capabilities is answered in Arizona with the ACTIC 
TLO. 
Beginning in 2004 the state of Arizona and its local partners developed an 
information sharing network that became known in Arizona as the Terrorism Liaison 
Officer (TLO) Program. The TLOs are made up of sworn law enforcement, sworn 
firefighters, members of the U.S. military and analysts working for a law enforcement 
agency.28 These are the agencies and operators that will have the responsibility for the 
coordination of critical public safety capabilities across the state. This is recognized by in 
the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which states, “The capabilities and 
resources of state, local, and tribal entities serve as a powerful force multiplier for the 
federal government’s counterterrorism efforts.”29 The 2014–2017 National Network of 
Fusion Centers strategy includes the vision of a “multidisciplinary, all-crimes/all-threats/
all-hazards information sharing network that protects our nation’s security and privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties of our citizens.”30 
TLOs provide the participant jurisdiction and discipline a specific and 
accountable link to the fusion center and intelligence community. One of the approaches 
of the Information Sharing Environment’s Strategic Implementation Plan during fiscal 
year 2015 is to “enhance collaboration between fusion centers and field-based 
information sharing entities to increase (fusion center) analytical competencies and 
collaboration.”31 Examples of enhanced collaboration include TLOs who are members of 
the fire service, who have provided examples of the TLO program in their disciplines 
28 Rickey Salyers, “TLO Roles & Responsibilities” (internal document, Arizona Counter Terrorism 
Information Center Terrorism Liaison Officer Basic School, May 2011).  
29 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf 
30 National Network of Fusion Centers, 2014–2017 National Strategy for the National Network of 
Fusion Centers, 2014, 
http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20F
usion%20Centers%202014.pdf, 16.   
31 Information Sharing Environment and National Security Staff, Strategic Implementation Plan for 




                                                 
publications. When firefighters come across suspicious activity, to whom and how do 
they report the activity? When fire departments (or any department) have a TLO, the 
reporting mechanism is clear. The firefighters TLO speak the same language as their 
peers and can communicate that information to the fusion center using the techniques 
taught in the basic TLO course.32  
The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is recognized by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security as the state and local fusion center for the state of 
Arizona. State and major urban area fusion centers are owned and operated by state and 
local entities, and are designated by the governor of their state. The federal government 
recognizes these designations and has a shared responsibility with state and local 
governments to support the national network of fusion centers.33  
Fusion centers may create their own mechanism for information sharing by 
implementing a TLO program. Legalities involving information sharing across the 
homeland security spectrum have been addressed in executive orders and legal opinions. 
Information and intelligence are not the same thing. Confidential or classified Homeland 
Security Information can be broken down into broad categories. These categories include 
federally classified information that is restricted by members of the federal intelligence 
community as confidential, secret and top secret. Second is criminal background 
information which is governed in Arizona by National Crime Information Center and 
Arizona’s Criminal Justice Information System. Finally there is criminal intelligence 
information which is governed by federal statute, 28 CFR Part 23, which addresses state 
and local intelligence databases.34  
There are a number of perceived issues with the TLO program and information 
sharing. Notably, the ACLU believes, “The issue that arises may be inevitable. Without 
32 Rickey L. Salyers, and Troy Lutrick “Best Defense,” Fire Chief, February 2011, 48–53, 
http://firechief.com/preparedness/firefighting_best_defense/ 
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” 
January 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information  
34 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, “28 CFR Part 23 Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating 
Policies,” September 1993, http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-
bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=e8d03d893ffe820b7bff662c197257a8&n=pt28.1.23&r=PART&ty=HTML 
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clear guidance and direction these centers may stray off their intended paths.”35 The 
ACTIC has a civil rights/civil liberties policy that meets the DHS standard for fusion 
centers. 36 Concerns have been voiced about threat assessments that target academic 
institutions and minorities.37 Civil rights and civil liberties policies are in place at the 
ACTIC and all TLOs are signatories on their understanding of these policies. Each 
ACTIC TLO must sign the following privacy policy dissemination acknowledgement: 
The recipient acknowledges attendance at the Privacy Policy training 
course and receipt of a copy of the ACTIC Privacy Policy and Procedures 
Guide. Recipient further acknowledges his/her responsibility to read and 
become familiar with this policy within 10 days from the date of receiving 
it. Failure to review this policy in a timely fashion or failure to comply 
with any provision of the policy may result in suspension of access to 
ACTIC information or other administrative actions or sanctions as 
appropriate.38  
Access to this federally classified information requires a security clearance. The 
federal intelligence community (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], FBI, 
Department of Defense, [DOD], DHS) use classification systems for gathering and 
sharing sensitive information.39 Federal classifications of confidential, secret and top 
secret are detailed in section 1.3 of Executive Order 13526.40 To have access to classified 
information, an individual is required to have the commensurate level of security 
clearance along with the right and need to know the information.  
35 J Monaco, “Spying on First Amendment Activity: State-by-State,” American Civil Liberties Union, 
accessed November 28, 2011, https://www.aclu.org/free-speech-technology-and-liberty/spy-files-spying-
first-amendment-activity-state-state  
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Civil Liberties 
Impact Assessment for the State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, 2008, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl_civil_liberties_impact_assessment_12_11_08.pdf 
37 Katherine McIntire Peters, “DHS-Supported Fusion Centers Raise Civil Liberties Concerns,” 
Government Executive, 2009, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2009/04/dhs-supported-fusion-centers-
raise-civil-liberties-concerns/29076/ 
38 Warren Simpson, Dissemination Acknowledgement Form ACTIC Privacy and Procedures Guide 
(Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 2010), 1. 
39 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community,” accessed March 14, 
2105, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic 
40 Exec. Order No. 13526 The White House Office of the Press Secretary December 29, 2009 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information 
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Aside from federal level of classified information, there is state and local 
information classified as sensitive but unclassified (SBU), also known as law 
enforcement sensitive (LES). Additionally, the FBI maintains the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) and the attorney general has created guidelines to structure 
the information in the database and outline with whom the NCIC information can be 
shared.41 The information contained in NCIC and Arizona’s version of NCIC, called 
Arizona Criminal Justice Information System,42 is considered SBU.  
In July of 2003, President Bush signed Executive Order 13311, which deals with 
information that is sensitive but unclassified and entering into nondisclosure agreements 
with appropriate “State and local personnel.” Authority to promulgate these procedural 
regulations was delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security in Executive Order 
13311.43  
Members of the ACTIC TLO program sign a dissemination acknowledgment 
form ACTIC privacy policy and procedures guide form44 (more commonly called a non-
disclosure agreement) as part of the ACTIC privacy policy portion of basic TLO school. 
In short, TLOs have access to SBU information.  
In April of 2005, President Bush signed another executive order clarifying state 
and local homeland security information sharing with “an individual who falls within the 
category of ‘State and local personnel’ as defined in sections 892(f)(3) and (f)(4) of the 
Act shall have access to information classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958 of 
April 17, 1995.”45 Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995 details what classified 
national security information consists of (confidential, secret and top secret).46 In short, 
41 U.S. Department of Justice, The Attorney General's Report on Criminal History Background 
Checks, 2006, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf, 71. 
42 Arizona State Legislature, “Title 13. Public Safety Criminal Identification Section Arizona Revised 
Statute. 41-1750,” http://www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/41/01750.htm 
43 Exec. Order No. 13311 (2003), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-08-04/pdf/WCPD-
2003-08-04-Pg998.pdf 
44 Simpson, Dissemination Acknowledgement Form, 1. 
45 Exec. Order No. 12958 (1995), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1995-04-24/pdf/WCPD-
1995-04-24-Pg634.pdf 
46 Ibid.   
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TLOs with the commensurate level of security clearance have access to federally 
classified information when they “need to know” the information.  
Criminal intelligence policies are defined in what state and local law enforcement 
commonly refers to as 28 CFR Part 23, which details what information can be maintained 
by a state or local law enforcement agencies on an individual or group; how the 
information will be submitted, secured, viewed, disseminated; and when it should be 
purged.47  
President Bush provided the executive orders concerning classified information 
and the Department of Justice provided the background document concerning 
information sharing in an opinion letter from the Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Office of General Counsel to the Director of the Homeland Security 
Operations Center in 2005. The letter states: 
Professionals engaged in seeking to detect, defeat, or deter terrorist acts 
are thereby engaged in law enforcement activities for purposes of 28 
C.F.R. pt. 23. Accordingly, those professionals, whether working at HSOC 
or another Federal, State, or local agencies engaged in this pursuit, may 
appropriately be provided access to the information they need to do the 
same, regardless of whether or not they themselves, or the agency in 
question, carry the title ‘law enforcement officer’ or ‘law enforcement 
agency.’48  
The 28 CFR Part 23 information can be shared among homeland security operations 
center (fusion center) partners in their official capacity.49 ACTIC TLOs meet who legal 
standard and have access to the information they require.  
The ACTIC TLOs fuse public safety intelligence and information. In addition, the 
TLOs communicate between response agencies and the ACTIC during moderate and 
large size incidents and special events. TLOs who respond to incidents need not be from 
the jurisdiction addressing the incident because the mutual aid system allows for cross 
47 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, “28 CFR Part 23 Criminal Intelligence Systems.”  
48 John J. Wilson, Office of Justice Programs Office of General Counsel, letter to Matthew E. 
Broderick, Homeland Security Operations Center, March 31, 2005.  
49 Ibid. 
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jurisdictional response.50 The TLOs are trained and equipped to address the information 
sharing needs of jurisdictions and the ACTIC across the state. Adam Stone addresses the 
important role of fusion centers in threat and response de-escalation in his article titled 
“National Fusion Center Model is Emerging” when he says, “Some say the role of the 
fusion center is to ensure the information is not wrongly elevated to the status of a 
national security threat.”51  
There are recent articles detailed how TLOs can help fusion centers meet key 
benchmarks in the federal fusion center guidance and fusion center baseline capabilities. 
These include the creation a collaborative environment for the sharing of intelligence and 
information among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement and public safety 
partners along with the private sector. The TLO achieves the fusion centers goal of a 
diversified representation of personnel based on the needs and functions of the center. 
Brenda Leffler of the Colorado State Patrol explained how Colorado “incorporate[s] non-
law enforcement entities into the center. So from the beginning, we said that firefighters, 
emergency services workers, critical infrastructure sector owners—all have a role in 
homeland security, and we have to do this together.”52 The fusion center baseline 
capabilities that are met include: planning, requirements development, information 
gathering/collection, and recognition of indicators and warnings along with the 
processing and collation of information. The TLO parent jurisdiction and the fusion 
centers become active participants in the personnel assignments, training, management, 
and governance of the TLO program and fusion center.53 
TLOs also provide the link to the fusion center from within jurisdictions. 
Members of the fire service have written about the benefit of the TLO program in their 
professional publications. Who do fire fighters receive information on suspicious activity 
from and to whom do firefighters report suspicious activity? When fire departments (or 
50 Salyers, and Lutrick “Best Defense,” 48–53.  
51 Adam Stone, “National Fusion Center Model is Emerging,” Emergency Management (January 
2015), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/National-Fusion-Center-Model-Is-Emerging.html 
52 Harwood, “A Model of Intelligence Sharing.” 
53 Saupp, “Fusion Liaison Officer Programs;” Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion 
Center Guidelines.  
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any department) have a TLO, the reporting mechanism is clear.54 TLOs can be assigned 
by their jurisdiction to work with the fusion center full time or part time depending in the 
size and needs of the jurisdiction. The basic FLO courses can take a day or a week, 
depending on the fusion center. This provides flexibility for the fusion center and the 
jurisdiction. Responsibilities of the TLO can include incident support, special events, 
threat, and vulnerability assessments, subject matter expertise and other areas that are 
important to the fusion center and the jurisdiction.55  
Page 13 of the Fusion Center Guidelines depicts fusion center information 
sharing as concentric information circles that partially overlap each other.56 Federal, 
state, and local staffing, equipment, facilities, and databases overlap at the fusion center. 
The conceptual model may not work if entities like critical infrastructure, elected 
officials, hazardous materials, or law enforcement are missing. When a fusion center 
establishes a TLO program the state and local information sharing circles can be linked at 
the fusion center.57 Political entities at the state and local levels can generate focus and 
engage in policy and funding of the fusion center. The TLO can be the link that can get 
fusion center information to the political entities like governors and mayors.58 
Much of the literature is dedicated to fusion center baseline capabilities and 
detailing why fusion centers are a good idea. The secretary of homeland security 
continues to state her commitment to fusion centers.59 TLOs become the liaisons between 
their agencies and the fusion center to facilitate regional and national information 
54 Salyers, and Lutrick “Best Defense,” 48–53. 
55 Salyers, “TLO Roles and Responsibilities.”  
56 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines, 10.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Yi-Ru Chen, “Tell Me What I Need to Know: What Mayors and Governors Want from Their Fusion 
Centers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009).  
59 “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano;” Bart R. Johnson, “DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis: Supporting the Front Lines of Homeland Security: Renewed Emphasis Designed 




                                                 
exchange.60 A TLO can be a jurisdictional and fusion center asset when it comes to 
operating in the information sharing environment.  
The TLO may became the “who” when it comes to who would fulfill the missions 
that are required of fusion centers like the ACTIC. Each fusion center can determine what 
professional capability (e.g., law enforcement, fire, EMS, private security) is appropriate 
to fulfill the role of the TLO to their individual fusion.61 According to the ACTIC, TLO 
basic course the roles and responsibilities of the TLO are: 
Arizona TLO’s operates from the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information 
Center (ACTIC). The TLO program provides a platform for Federal, State, 
Local and Tribal representatives to share information related to local and 
global terrorist and criminal threats and potential incidents. Arizona’s 
TLO Program provides an expansive statewide network of personnel by 
combining law enforcement and fire service personnel resources linked to 
Federal, State, Local and Tribal information and intelligence, which 
provides an effective and viable communication flow to and from the 
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center.62  
Much of the operational work that the information sharing environment requires 
is possessed at the state, region or local level. The ACTIC TLO program fulfills the needs 
of the information sharing environment (ISE) including federal partners, the fusion 
center, and the home jurisdiction of each TLO. The literature describes different entities 
that participate in the state and major urban area TLO programs. Many TLO programs 
include law enforcement, fire service, EMS, public health, and other disciplines. Some 
programs incorporate the private sector. Each center is owned and operated by its unique 
state or major urban area. Fusion centers can determine what professional capabilities 
(e.g., law enforcement, fire, EMS, private security) are appropriate to fulfill the role of 
the TLO within their individual fusion.63 
60 Anthony Lukin, “Criminal Justice Terrorism Liaison Officer,” California Emergency Management, 
August 22, 2011, accessed January 20, 2012, 
http://www.calema.ca.gov/CSTI/Documents/Course%20Catalog/Terrorism%20Liaison%20Officer.pdf  
61 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Technical Assistance Catalog, 2009, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/npd_technical_assistance_catalog.pdf; DHS, and Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities, 10; Saupp, “Fusion Liaison Officer Programs.”  
62 Salyers, “TLO Roles & Responsibilities.”  
63 Saupp, “Fusion Liaison Officer Programs.” 
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State, local, and tribal law enforcement and homeland security officials are being 
asked to do more with less. Fusion centers offer a way to leverage financial resources and 
the expertise of numerous public safety partners to more effectively protect communities. 
Elected officials and homeland security leaders can better utilize limited resources to 
make effective decisions about public safety matters and address threats to the homeland 
by embracing their fusion center partners. TLOs may provide the link or capability that 
the information sharing environment needs.64 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The first chapter of this thesis has focused on the ACTIC’s TLO Program as a 
conceptual model for homeland security fusion centers. Fusion centers need to build an 
institutionalized relationship with their fusion center partners that foster an information 
sharing environment across the fusion centers federal, state, tribal, and local constituents. 
The ACTIC TLO Program can be a model for burgeoning fusion centers that want to 
leverage the need to build information sharing communication loop while simultaneously 
furthering the fusion centers efforts in achieving the baseline capabilities of a fusion 
center. The literature review of this chapter attempts to encapsulate the variety of 
literature that addresses fusion center intentions, capabilities, and needs.  
The second chapter will provide a historical perspective to the reader on the 
creation of the post 9/11 city of Phoenix’s Liaison Officer Program, the Arizona Counter 
Terrorism Information Center, and their unified efforts in creating the Terrorism Liaison 
Officer Program.  
The third chapter describes the focus areas of the ACTIC TLO. The three focus 
areas of the TLO are information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, and on scene 
response. The information sharing capability specifically addresses the threats, hazards, 
and issues that the ACTIC TLOs focus on. The chapter goes on to describe the TLO 
stakeholder jurisdictions and the TLO roles and responsibilities along with their issues, 
dynamics, and challenges. The chapter concludes with the weakness that are present in 
64 DHS, National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet. 
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the program along with the committees and handbook that have been developed to 
provide guidance to the program.  
The fourth chapter looks at the capacities and capabilities of three separate fusion 
center liaison officer programs. In addition, the chapter demonstrates the nuanced ways 
different fusion centers leverage their liaison officer programs to address various fusion 
center priorities. This also shows that the fusion liaison officer model is not a one size fits 
all solution to fulfilling any fusion center gaps.  
The fifth chapter looks at how the ACTIC TLO Program can be used as a model 
nationally. While there is no one size fits all solution to create and sustain a fusion liaison 
officer program, there are baseline capabilities that fusion centers must address. The 
ACTIC model provides a framework in which liaison officers are leveraged to the fusion 
centers’ benefit to address baseline capabilities and further benefit their home agencies.  
Chapter VI provides the reader recommendations and conclusions, which 
recommendations include leveraging liaison officer programs to address many of the 
requirements of the fusion center and address the foundational needs of fusion centers to 
create an information sharing environment. The information sharing environment, created 
through the implementation of a liaison officer program, can institutionalize the 
relationship between the fusion center and its constituent and partners. The chapter 
finishes with recommendations that a liaison officer program be included in the definition 
as a necessary component of a state and major urban area fusion center. The chapter also 
recommends that the baseline capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers be 
modified to make a liaison officer program a necessary component of a fully capable 
fusion center.  
Finally, Chapter VII concludes the thesis and notes the importance of creating an 
institutional relationship across all levels of government in the homeland security arena. 
Fusion centers have been created to foster information sharing environments along with 
adding capacity and capability to states and urban areas. The key to institutionalizing the 
fusion center relationships is a baseline capability of a liaison officer program.  
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II. ARIZONA’S FUSION CENTER HISTORY 
There were significant changes in the United States government at all levels in the 
years following the September 11, 2001, attacks. The federal government began 
implementing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Arizona’s governor 
generated an executive order called “The Roadmap to Securing Arizona.” The city of 
Phoenix’s management unified the homeland security efforts of the police and fire 
departments with the city’s emergency management coordinator and the public health 
manager in a unified command Homeland Defense Bureau. 
In Arizona, Governor Janet Napolitano’s 2003 Roadmap for Arizona Homeland 
Security fostered a collaborative homeland security atmosphere. The executive order 
directed 10 action items.65 Action item seven directed the establishment of “a 24/7 
intelligence/ information analysis center that will serve as a central hub to facilitate the 
collection, analysis and dissemination of crime and terrorism related information.”66 This 
later became known as the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC). 
Action item three directed the establishment of “formal protocols that facilitate 
multiagency coordination during critical incident response,”67 which later became known 
as the ACTIC Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program.  
A. CITY OF PHOENIX HOMELAND DEFENSE BUREAU 
In late 2002, Phoenix Fire Chief Alan Brunacini and Police Chief Harold Hurtt 
agreed to link Phoenix’s homeland security efforts under one unified command. The core 
members of the team were the city’s emergency management coordinator, public health 
manager along with the police and fire department units responsible for homeland 
security issues. The city’s public safety management acknowledged that none of the 
departments can thoroughly impact any moderate or large scale incident or event without 
65 Janet Napolitano, Securing Arizona: A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security, April 23, 2003, 
http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/cdm/ref/collection/statepubs/id/3089, 1–2. 
66 Ibid., 2.  
67 Ibid., 1.  
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the support and engagement of the other public safety department. In Phoenix, the fire 
department is responsible for fires, emergency medical services, arson investigations, 
technical rescue, and hazardous materials operations typically referred to as special 
operations.68 The fire department manages, mans and participates in an automatic aid 
dispatch system. Automatic aid dispatch runs the radio and data communications 
capability for the vast majority of the region. In addition, this dispatch center is 
commonly referred to as the Alarm Room. Twenty five regional fire services are 
dispatched and managed from the Phoenix Alarm Room.  
The police department is responsible for all law enforcement operations in the 
city. These responsibilities include patrol, investigations, SWAT, aviation, and other 
special operations capabilities. In 2002, the city of Phoenix had fulltime staff working on 
a variety of homeland security initiatives. The Phoenix Fire Department had assigned a 
fire captain to the burgeoning initiative of Fire Service Intelligence. The police 
department had assigned detectives to work on initiatives like critical infrastructure 
protection, community outreach, incident response, and information sharing.  
In early 2003, the city moved the unified group into the building just below the 
Alarm Room at fire headquarters. The team was then named the City of Phoenix 
Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) and included members from the police, fire, public 
health, and emergency management. The team was directed to develop a plan to unify the 
city’s homeland security efforts. The bureau’s efforts focused on the city of Phoenix’s 
homeland security operations and new opportunities in grant funding. Fire Chief Alan 
Brunacini and Police Chief Harold Hurtt agreed that one of the jobs of the newly 
assigned staff was to develop a police/fire homeland liaison officer position.69 The 
liaison officer duties eventually came to include incident response to support fire and 
police commanders in the field. These liaison duties unified disparate public safety 
incident command posts and addressed the burgeoning homeland security threat. At the 
68 Phoenix Fire Department, Strategic Plan 2014–2016, 
https://www.phoenix.gov/firesite/Documents/strategicplan.pdf, 11. 
69 Phoenix Police Department, Transfers and Reassignments William Wickers, Sergeant from 
Maryvale Precinct to the Office of Administration (internal document, Phoenix Police Department, 
Phoenix, AZ, December 2002).  
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time, the concept was named the tactical liaison officer. The tactical liaison officers 
began by responding to large hazardous materials incidents, complex technical rescue 
incidents, and major police incidents. Additionally, they assumed the responsibility of 
responding to these incidents and working with their discipline’s counterpart command. 
On moderate and large incidents, the police liaison responded to the fire command and 
the fire liaison responded to the police command. Furthermore, the tactical liaison 
officers built bridges and worked out issues between public safety command posts. This 
core group was the same team that later developed and staffed the Terrorism Liaison 
Officer Program.  
In a time of significant change, focused on homeland security, the city researched 
smart practices in jurisdictions facing similar issues. The HDB members identified 
similar initiatives that were being developed in other jurisdictions like Lt. John Sullivan’s 
Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Program in Los Angeles along with the California 
Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, which had been conceptualized by the South Bay 
Police Chiefs’ Terrorism Advisory Group, chaired by Redondo Beach Police Lieutenant 
John Skipper in southern California.  
Members of the Homeland Defense Bureau traveled to California to identify 
current practices in unifying public safety efforts in homeland security. The group met 
with Los Angeles Police Department’s Jim McDonnell and John Miller along with their 
staff and later the general manager of the city’s Emergency Management Department 
James Featherstone. They traveled and met with other leaders, including Lt. John 
Sullivan’s at Los Angeles’ TEW facility. These initiatives were later foundational in the 
development of the ACTIC TLO Program. Bureau members noted that the perspectives 
of the different initiatives and strategies were each appropriately tailored to meet the 
needs of each jurisdiction.  
In 2004, Chief Brunacini assigned a Phoenix fire captain to the Homeland 
Defense Bureau to focus on incorporating the fire service into the intelligence 
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community.70 In retrospect, the addition of that particular fire captain, including his 
skills, knowledge, and abilities became a cornerstone upon which the TLO program was 
built. The captain, a senior firefighter paramedic who was returning from a Marine Corps 
deployment, was assigned as the intelligence officer and tactical liaison officer 
representing the Phoenix Fire Department. With his robust military intelligence 
background, the captain easily articulated the need for a public safety, as opposed to a 
law enforcement approach to intelligence and information sharing.  
B. ARIZONA COUNTER TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER 
In 2003, members of the Homeland Defense Bureau met with the commander of 
the Arizona Department of Public Safety’s (DPS) Intelligence Detail and the FBI 
assistant special agent in charge who was responsible for the Phoenix Joint Terrorism 
Task Force. The concept of the fusion center was discussed. The parties moved forward 
with unifying their homeland security efforts with the intent of funding the fusion center 
capability using homeland security grant funds. The DPS assigned a lieutenant to identify 
the location and manage the budgeting issues. In addition, the DPS lieutenant formed a 
committee and managed the fusion center from concept through to implementation. In 
October of 2004, the doors of the ACTIC, the only federally recognized fusion center in 
the state of Arizona, opened, and it has been in operation ever since. The ACTIC located 
in Phoenix, Arizona, which lies in the center of the state and in the center of Maricopa 
County. Phoenix is the sixth most populated city in the United States and lies within the 
fourth most populated county in the country.71 Furthermore, the ACTIC’s members had 
access to over 100 databases, and it was the INTERPOL link in Arizona. The city of 
Phoenix assigned many of the Homeland Defense Bureau fire and police officers to work 
at the ACTIC.  
70 John Maldonado, Phoenix Fire Department, Transfers and Reassignments—Rickey L. Salyers from 
Station 8 to Homeland Defense (internal document, Phoenix Police Department, Phoenix, AZ, December 
2004).  
71 United States Census Bureau, “Quick Facts,” 2011, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/04013.html 
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The mission of the ACTIC is to “protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of 
Arizona by enhancing and coordinating counter terrorism intelligence and other 
investigative support efforts among local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.” 
Furthermore, the vision of the ACTIC is “to prevent terrorism and related crimes, thereby 
providing a safe and secure environment for the citizens of Arizona.”72 Additionally, the 
goal of the ACTIC is to “fuse local, state, tribal, federal public safety agencies 
information sharing capabilities and involve public & private sectors in the process.”73 
The ACTIC structure is composed of full-time staff from many jurisdictions 
across the federal state and local public safety spectrum. The federal agencies include 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security investigations, intelligence and analysis along 
with the reports officer. The state agencies include the Arizona Department of Public 
Safety Intelligence, Global Imaging Unit (mapping), Hazardous Materials Squad, 
Criminal Investigations Research, Computer Forensics unit, terrorism liaison officer 
statewide coordinator, and ACTIC management. Maricopa County is represented with 
their homeland security and facial recognition units. The city of Phoenix is represented 
by its Homeland Defense Bureau including its Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, 
Intelligence and Investigations Unit, Major Offender/Career Criminal Unit, Computer 
Forensic Squad, Threat Mitigation Squad, and the Criminal Intelligence Analyst Unit.  
The ACTIC Intelligence Unit is staffed with a DPS supervisor and analysts who 
create documents specific to the needs of the fusion center. These documents include 
suspicious activity, situational awareness and informational updates relevant to public 
safety and private sector partners across the state. The unit works closely with the U.S. 
DHS I&A representative, and it creates or participates in creating threat assessments 
concerning special events like National Basketball Association and Major League 
Baseball all-star games, playoff games for any of the professional sports teams, or events 
that may generate civil unrest. The analysts leverage the TLO Program to assist in the 
collection of data that is needed to create the products.  
72 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, “Mission Vision,” 2004, 
http://www.azactic.gov/About/Mission_Vision/ 
73 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center ACTIC Overview (internal document, Arizona 
Counter Terrorism Information Center, Phoenix, AZ, May 2011), Slide 2.  
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After a few months of working at the ACTIC, it was clear to many that the 
Phoenix fire captain was the driving force in creating a trusted partner relationship among 
fusion center participants. His position in the fire service remained focused on fire service 
intelligence, but he was asked to take over the responsibilities of a program that had 
started as a tactical liaison officer program in Phoenix. The statewide coordinator 
position was an additional duty. The new program was intended to address information 
and intelligence sharing along with critical infrastructure protection and incident 
response. The initiative was called the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program.  
C. TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER 
Opening in October 2004, the ACTIC provided the hub where Arizona’s public 
safety network would be formed. The ACTIC had the opportunity to create an 
institutionalized relationship with its partner entities. The city of Phoenix tactical liaison 
officers was the logical staff to work with the ACTIC as the ACTIC worked toward 
building its information sharing environment (ISE). A group of city of Phoenix staff 
moved into the ACTIC when it opened.  
Information sharing is the core capability of the ACTIC and any fusion center. 
The TLO program provides the ACTIC a network capable as the backbone of the states 
ISE. In Arizona, the TLO ISE is complimented by two other TLO program capacities. 
The second capacity provides a link between the ACTIC and critical infrastructure 
partners through the TLO program members who have established relationships between 
their jurisdictions and their local critical infrastructure. Lastly, the TLO Program provides 
direct support to its member jurisdiction with TLOs, who respond to critical incidents in 
jurisdictions across the state. This “on scene response” (OSR) provides the ACTIC and 
decision maker’s access to information directly from the scene of an incident, and it 
provides the incident commander and responder’s at the actual incident access to data and 
resources that are available through the ACTIC.  
The TLO is essentially the team or individual that is designated by a jurisdiction 
as their trusted partner to exchange information with the ACTIC. Depending on the size 
of a jurisdiction and their ability to participate in the program a TLO may serve in a full-
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time capacity or as an additional duty to a jurisdictions employee. Many jurisdictions in 
Arizona commit to having their TLOs participate in TLO related work 10 to 25 percent of 
their shift.  
The ACTIC TLO program has been compared to a milk stool. The program relies 
on three legs, or components, which include the ISE, CI protection, and OSR. 
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III. THE THREE FOCUS AREAS OF AN ACTIC TLO 
A. INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT 
Police, fire, EMS, public health, and their other public safety partners typically 
meet at an incident, addressed the needs of the incident, and go their separate ways. Mass 
casualty events along with manmade and natural disasters typically reveal a void in 
communication. The TLO Program created a trusted partner environment between public 
safety partners by bringing these disparate disciplines together to address public safety 
issues and events in Arizona. This ACTIC liaison officer trusted partnership was a new 
and smart practice in Arizona that has been beneficial during countless critical incidents. 
Jurisdictions cannot assemble an ad-hoc group of trained, vetted, and trusted liaisons 
from public safety agencies as situations arise. Fire, law enforcement, public health, and 
other TLO Program participants know critical incidents are not a surprise. The ACTIC 
TLO Program is a best practice model for jurisdictions and fusion centers that know that 
critical incidents and the need for information sharing are no surprise and it is in the best 
interest of the fusion center and their constituent jurisdictions to unite in a strong 
information sharing network.  
The TLO is Arizona’s method of addressing the national strategy for information 
sharing direction that “…fusion centers… serve as the primary focal points within the 
state and local environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related 
information.”74 The TLO Program takes operators from disparate disciplines and creates 
an information sharing environment where homeland security issues can be addressed 
seamlessly. The intention of the program is to build bridges between these partner 
disciplines and address gathering and sharing of information, critical infrastructure 
protection, and response to critical scenes. The fusion center and its partners have 
homeland security interest in each of these capacities and capabilities.  
74 White House, Sharing Information with State, Local, and Tribal Governments (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/ 
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Multidisciplined TLOs respond to expanding incidents, planned events, attend the 
same training, and are provided the same equipment. This has created a trusted network 
of public safety officials who exchange necessary information with and through the 
ACTIC. Participants in the TLO program are trained about the sensitivity of the 
information that is available to them through the ACTIC and they sign non-disclosure 
agreements. Many TLOs from a variety of disciplines get a security clearance so they can 
view information that is classified at the federal level.  
When the ACTIC opened as Arizona’s fusion center its federal partners 
committed to sponsoring security clearances for state and local personnel assigned to the 
facility. The TLOs that are assigned by their agencies to participate in the ACTIC submit 
their application for their secret clearance after graduation from the TLO school and six 
months of active participation in the program. The addition of a security clearance to a 
TLOs resume removes an information sharing prohibition that previously existed. Non-
traditional partners that have their clearance through the ACTIC include public health 
managers, firefighters, and fire prevention engineers. The benefits of the security 
clearance are seen consistently. The clearance fosters a trusted partner relationship 
between the individuals who may over-classify or section off important public safety 
information and it includes access to appropriately classified material for national 
security purposes. Information that is important to public safety employees across the 
spectrum is available to them. These are the same individuals who are responding to 
homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure across the state. The incorporation of these 
partners is a force multiplier and does not require the addition of any new staff.  
The TLO program makes information available to public safety officers outside of 
law enforcement. Like an analyst, access is granted to law enforcement sensitive 
information as long as the participant is assigned to the TLO program. Fire service 
employees who are assigned to the fusion center as TLOs have access to law enforcement 
databases. The intention of the program is to create an environment where the need to 
share critical or safety information trumps the need to maintain stovepipes of information 
under the umbrella of a security classification (see Figures 1 and 2).  
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Figure 2.  Fused Capabilities and Needs 
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ACTIC’s information sharing core capability has been addressed and documented 
with the published collection plan. The collection plan provides TLOs and other ACTIC 
partners the structured and defendable list of areas the fusion center focuses on. The core 
of the suspicious activity reporting system is having a plan that identifies the specific 
information that ACTICs partner jurisdictions require to address their areas of 
responsibility.  
The ACTIC, DHS, and the FBI each maintain a list of collection requirements 
that they each publish. Each collection requirements lists the information that the 
individual entities require to fulfill their responsibility to the intelligence community. 
Examples include information on drug trafficking organizations, terrorism, and terrorist 
organization along with other areas that the agencies are responsible to address. During 
the basic TLO School, the ACTIC collection requirements are distributed and are taught 
to the TLOs. Reportable events occur and information is collected by TLOs in 
jurisdictions across Arizona. Each jurisdictions TLO can provide the necessary 
information to the ACTIC along with the FBI and DHS through a standard reporting 
mechanism that the TLO is trained to use. When the ACTIC, DHS, or the FBI have 
information that is relevant to the jurisdictions in Arizona the information is distributed to 
the TLOs for further distribution throughout their particular jurisdiction.  
One of the best practices of the ACTIC was the development of an intelligence collection 
plan. The ACTIC Collection Plan was developed by the ACTIC Intelligence Committee 
after it surveyed Arizona’s law enforcement agencies. The survey demonstrated that the 
ACTIC has three areas of concern consisting of threats, hazards and issues. The survey 
further demonstrated twelve focus areas that require information collection and 
documentation (Table 1). The information is collected by the ACTIC’s Watch Center 
from TLOs and anyone wishing to contribute in a 28-CFR compliant database housed at 
the ACTIC, which is managed by the ACTICs analysts. Documents created from this 
data include situational awareness bulletins and public safety/criminal case support. The 
ACTIC collection plan is unclassified. Table 1 represents the focus areas of the collection 
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plan. “Collection derives directly from requirements” explains why each of the 12 focus 
areas of the Plan has specific collection requirements.75  
Table 1.   ACTIC Collection Priorities 
THREATS HAZARDS ISSUES 
Domestic and International Terrorism Health Hazards Regional Crime Trends 
Threats to Law Enforcement, Public 
Safety and other officials 
 
Natural Hazards 
Border Issues, Violence, 
Human/Weapon 
Trafficking 
Threats and Assessments of Critical 
Infrastructure 
 Strategic Narcotics 
Intelligence  
Threats to Special or Public Events Critical Incident 
Support 
Gang Intelligence 




Each category in the collection plan has detailed subcategories that reveal sources 
and methods concerning ACTIC’s information collection. These subcategories are called 
collection requirements. The collection requirements are classified as “public safety 
sensitive” (PSS).76 TLO member jurisdictions are not solely law enforcement 
organizations so this is an important caveat. The reason for the sensitivity is the harm that 
could occur to an individual or institution if the name of the information’s source or the 
method an institution used to collect the information is revealed. The state of Arizona’s 
PSS classification standard is intended to be similar to the federal governments controlled 
unclassified information standard.77 
The information can come in from law enforcement, TLOs, ACTIC partners, 
community partners, and the public. The ACTIC has police officers and analysts assigned 
to take in, document, and make notifications concerning suspicious activity reports. The 
75 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012), 62.  
76 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center ACTIC Information Classification, Access, 
Dissemination, Storage and Destruction Policy (internal document, Arizona Counter Terrorism 
Information Center, Phoenix, AZ, March 2006).  
77 Exec. Order No. 13556 (2010), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=14168 
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ACTIC strategic intelligence analysts develop products based on the collection plan and 
collection requirements from the data that the police officers enter. The analysts create 
law enforcement, public safety, official use, and unclassified information products from 
the information they receive.  
The ACTIC is sensitive to the civil rights and civil liberties issues that come along 
with collecting and maintaining intelligence and information data. Each TLO is requires 
to take and pass the online 28 CFR part 23 training before he or she starts the basic TLO 
school. The TLO school instructs the students on the type of information the ACTIC 
needs to collect. That information is based on a criminal predicate or a threat to public 
safety. In addition, the information needs to be based on reasonable suspicion that the 
individual or group has committed or is planning to commit criminal/terrorist act. The 
information should be relevant to investigation or the prosecution of suspected criminal/
terrorist incidents, law enforcement, or crime prevention. The data should be useful in 
analysis and focused on public safety.  
The information is used in crime suppression efforts, which includes terrorism, 
and assists agencies concerning the deployment of assets for law enforcement and 
prosecution. The information can be tactical or strategic and should focus on the 
existence, identification, capability of individuals and organizations suspected on 
criminal or terrorist activity.  
The ACTIC does not pursue or maintain information based on constitutionally 
protected activities including race, ethnicity, citizenship, origin, age, disability, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, political, and social activities or activities that are not 
criminal. Rather, the ACTIC concentrates on dependable information sources so its 
products will be accurate, relevant and current. Many times this dependable source is the 
TLO.  
The ACTIC maintains this data in a secure database that has access controls and is 
audited to assure compliance with the policies of the ACTIC along with state and federal 
law. The release of information contained in the database will follow state and federal 
law. These laws are commonly referred to as sunshine laws.  
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B. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The city of Phoenix group that moved into the ACTIC included a detective whose 
background and education included undergraduate and graduate studies in architecture, 
design and construction along with over a decade of training and experience as a city of 
Phoenix bomb technician. The detective had been conducting threat and vulnerability 
assessments of sites the city of Phoenix considered critical for years before 9/11. After 9/
11, he shouldered the responsibility of threat mitigation, or what we now call critical 
infrastructure (CI) protection.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) addresses critical 
infrastructures that provide the essential services that underpin American society.78 The 
nation possesses numerous critical infrastructures, whose exploitation or destruction by 
terrorists could cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to those 
from the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or could profoundly affect our national 
prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical infrastructure so vital that its 
incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction, through terrorist attack, could have a 
debilitating effect on security and economic well-being. 
Critical infrastructures is defined in U.S. Code as “systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”79 Key 
resources are defined in U.S. Code as “publicly or privately controlled resources essential 
to the minimal operations of the economy and government.”80 According to DHS,  
78 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-
presidential-directive-7#1 
79 “Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 42 U.S.C. 5195c,” Government Printing Office, 
accessed February 16, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/html/USCODE-2010-
title42-chap68-subchapIV-B-sec5195c.htm 




                                                 
Critical infrastructure is the backbone of our Nation’s economy, security 
and health. We know it as the power we use in our homes, the water we 
drink, the transportation that moves us, and the communication systems 
we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family. 81  
DHS goes on to make clear that  
fusion centers serve as the focal points within the state and local 
environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-
related information and have additional responsibilities related to the 
coordination of critical operational capabilities across the statewide fusion 
process with other recognized fusion centers.82 
The detective, the fire captain, and the HDB group conceptualized a program 
where the homeland security needs of the CI community, the ACTIC, and the public 
safety agencies in the Arizona’s communities would be met. The concept became a key 
component of the TLO program. The plan was to secure grant funding for the TLO 
program by having the TLOs focus their efforts on CI protection. This complimented the 
information sharing efforts that the ACTIC was developing. The CI data is not beneficial 
sitting in a data storage devise at the fusion center. Public safety agencies can benefit 
from the data in their jurisdictions to make themselves and their community safer. The 
logical solution to collecting data and conducting threat and vulnerability assessments 
was to provide TLOs the capability to assess the CI in their jurisdictions. They realized 
that CI information could be stored securely at the ACTIC and the data could be linked 
through a TLO to an incident commander who was responsible for addressing incidents 
at the CI. They worked to develop and maintain a secure internet accessible database for 
maintaining the CI data, and the database was later made available to TLOs in the field 
responding to incidents at the CI. The group, working out of the state’s fusion center, was 
focused on regional and statewide capabilities and not the capabilities and issues of a 
single jurisdiction.  
The information included in the CI database accessible to responders through the 
TLO include the facility’s hours, photos, maps, hazardous materials, plans, procedures, 
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience Month,” 
2012, http://www.dhs.gov/cipr-month-2012 
82 Ibid.  
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and other information, including points of contact. The TLO is a member of the diverse 
assessment team that conducts a threat and vulnerability assessment (TVA) on the CI. 
This team includes trained TLOs who use their expertise during the TVA. The TLO 
disciplines that participate in the assessments typically include law enforcement, fire 
service, EMS, hazardous materials technicians, special weapons and tactics tacticians, 
bomb technicians, and others. TLOs who are assigned a level “A” or “B” kit are 
responsible for participating in the threat mitigation of CI on behalf of the ACTIC and 
their agency. This includes the identification, collection, and proper documentation of 
Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) information. 
This TVA is useful for a variety of reasons. For example, the TVAs are used by 
the city and region to demonstrate the need for homeland security grant funding. In 
addition, the TVA data is beneficial to incident commanders and responders who address 
the myriad of calls for service at these facilities. Moreover, the TVA provides a one-stop 
shop for critical information. 
A fusion center that plans to address CI needs to identify the system that will 
work best for its needs. The basis for the method the TLO program uses in Arizona is the 
capability to view the CI data in the field by the TLO specific disciplines and 
jurisdictions. This is in place so the assessment data is available to an incident 
commander addressing the myriad of issues that occur at these critical facilities.  
To collect and maintain CI data DHS and the ACTIC has used ACAMS, which 
maintained the documented critical infrastructure information in an accessible format. In 
Arizona, the TLOs conduct the threat and vulnerability assessments of CI and input the 
data into the system. The information in the system is protected critical infrastructure 
information (PCII).  
DHS estimates that 85 percent of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by 
the private sector.83 Members of the private sector depend on the security of proprietary 
information that they use to operate their businesses. Some of this proprietary 
83 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready Business Mentoring Guide, 2014, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1392217307183-
56ed30008abd809cac1a3027488a4c24/2014_business_user_guide.pdf, 8.  
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information is important to enhancing the security of the critical infrastructure so it is 
documented in ACAMS. There are federal and Arizona state laws prohibiting the release 
of PCII. The PCII Act of 2002 defines PCII as “Information not customarily in the public 
domain and related to the security of Critical infrastructure or protected systems.”84 
Violation of the Arizona or federal law may result in imprisonment, fines, loss of 
employment, or related penalties.85  
DHS assigned a protective security advisor (PSA) to Arizona. Arizona’s PSA is 
responsible for conducting threat and vulnerability assessments along with providing 
national coordination for critical infrastructure protective programs in Arizona. They 
work in response and recovery efforts to reduce risk to the critical infrastructure,86 which 
is a tall order for any individual or agency. The logical avenue for Arizona’s PSA to work 
through is the ACTIC and with the TLOs who have the relationships and points of 
contact throughout the state’s critical infrastructure.  
ACTIC TLO program members from the ACTIC’s Threat Mitigation Unit (TMU) 
work in partnership with the PSA to conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, also 
known as critical infrastructure assessments. The TLOs who conduct the assessments will 
be from the representative disciplines of the TLO Program including fire, HazMat, 
police, SWAT, bombs, and related disciplines. This assures that the assessments are done 
from an all-hazards perspective. There is a training block on how to conduct the 
assessments that is available through the TLO Program.  
When the assessment is complete, the TLO will have a number of 
recommendations for the CI partners to consider as they move forward. These are 
recommendations and not requirements; the recommendations are intended to reduce or 
remove vulnerabilities at the facility. The ACTIC, TMU, and the TLO Program are not 
regulatory entities.  
84 6 CFR 29.2 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 
http://cfr.regstoday.com/6cfr29.aspx#6_CFR_29p2 
85 Critical Infrastructure Information System Arizona Revised Statutes Article 7.1 41-1805; 6 CFR 
29.9 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information http://cfr.regstoday.com/6cfr29.aspx#6_CFR_29p2 
86 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Protective Security Advisor Program,” December 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PSA-Fact-Sheet-508.pdf  
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Identification of CI may seem as simple as checking the DHS website, which 
shows clearly the 18 CI sectors are agriculture / food, banking and finance, chemical and 
hazardous materials industry, defense industry base, energy, emergency services, 
information technology, telecommunications, postal and shipping, public health, 
transportation, water, national monuments and icons, commercial assets, government 
facilities, dams, nuclear power plants, and critical manufacturing. Identification of these 
sites may require that the TLOs to work with their dispatch or communication units. TLO 
jurisdictions will likely have the locations documented as site specific hazards, and 
jurisdictions with hazardous materials assets can leverage that knowledge to identify 
critical sites. For example, a fire service TLO may have a relationship with sites that have 
specific response needs, such as bulk foam for fuel tank farms, or public health TLOs 
may have a relationship with radiological assets because they store potassium iodine in 
the case of an incident. Additionally, some large jurisdictions may have a special hazards 
unit that may assist the TLO with asset identification. Furthermore, some sites may meet 
local or regional criteria that show they are critical to the local or regional community, 
but they may not rise to the level of a nationally critical asset. Arizona’s ACAMS system 
can be used to collect the data for use by the local community’s responders, the TLOs, 
the ACTIC, and DHS. 
The ACTIC maintains an Arizona specific database that contains all the local, 
state and national CI data. The system is linked to the national ACAMS system, and the 
nationally significant data is uploaded to DHS. The ACTIC uses a secure server that can 
be accessed by TLO computers through the use of air cards so the data can be entered 
into the system and can be accessed as needed. This enhances the response capabilities of 
the ACTIC public safety partners. The TVA information is protected by Arizona and 
federal laws and policies, and each TLO is trained in the related laws and policies.  
The Department of Public Safety has the statutory responsibility to store, manage 
and secure the protective critical infrastructure information (PCII) according to state law 
(ARS Title 41, § 1801-1804).87 The PCII data is managed at the ACTIC where the data 
87 “Critical Infrastructure Information System Arizona Revised Statutes Article 7.1 41-1801—41-
1804,” accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp?Title=41 
 37 
                                                 
that is collected by the TLOs is stored and used as needed. This database is available to 
TLOs in the field who are supporting incident commanders who address events and 
incidents at these critical locations. This unification of effort and databases concerning 
critical infrastructure is a best practice. The state law provides legal protection for the 
sensitive data, and the trained and equipped staff maintains the data for use during critical 
incidents or special events.  
C. ON-SCENE RESPONSE 
The history of the city of Phoenix TLO’s involved the expectation that TLOs 
would provide a capability to responders in the field. Intelligence-based decision making 
is the way many public safety decision makers in Phoenix refer to the addition of the 
TLO capability. 
The TLO program has leveraged ACTIC and Phoenix Homeland Security Grant 
Program funds to support CI assessments and information sharing. The TLO Program 
purchased laptop computers and air cards to link the TLOs in jurisdictions across the state 
to the ACTIC. The TLOs collected and entered the data into the ACTIC CI databases. 
With their TLO laptop, they can also access the CI information they had entered along 
with the information contained in and accessible through the ACTIC’s many criminal, 
intelligence, and investigative databases.  
On-scene response is based on jurisdictional needs. On-scene response provides 
the participating jurisdiction immediate reach back to ACTIC which provides incident 
command with real time intelligence. The TLO’s become the intelligence branch of 
NIMS.88 
In the Phoenix region, TLOs are dispatched through the Phoenix Fire 
Department’s data and voice communications center called the “Alarm Room.” When 
TLOs are requested by first responders and jurisdictions operating in the field, the TLOs 
get a page on their cell phone or pager. In response, the TLOs will call the dispatch center 
or the incident command post to determine the nature of the call and identify what 
88 Salyers, “TLO Roles & Responsibilities.”  
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intelligence assets will be needed to appropriately address the incident. Those assets 
include the ACTIC’s facial recognition unit and criminal investigations research unit of 
any number of assets. The TLOs will place that capability on standby, which means that 
the operators working in those areas will focus their efforts on the incident currently 
being addressed in the field as a priority.  
The TLOs are also automatically dispatched during a standard list of specific calls 
for service across the region. TLOs are deployed to calls ranging from weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) (e.g., suspected cases of anthrax, ricin, radiological), significant 
HazMat, unknown substance, bomb callouts, to Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(major medicals), moderate- and high-risk search warrants, drug laboratories, and officer 
shootings among others.  
TLOs respond to three categories of incidents referred to as tiers. A Tier III 
incident is a local event that does not require resources outside of the TLOs’ jurisdictions. 
These incidents include supporting the SWAT team or HazMat team on incidents they 
are resolving. Tier II incidents are incidents that require a number of jurisdictions or a 
number of TLOs to address the issue. These incidents may include officer involved 
shootings and complex hostage barricades. Tier I incidents are complex critical incidents 
that require multiagency unified command, such as a large structural collapse, a terrorist 
event, or major medical event. 
While terrorism liaison officers normally operate in pairs of one law enforcement 
officer (detective or sergeant) and one fire services (company officer), intensive cross 
training and certification makes it possible for both law enforcement and fire services 
TLOs to operate independently. The intent is having a unified intelligence public safety 
capability at the scene of these incidents.  
The fire service staffs the position commensurate with their shifts. They cover 24 
hours a day, seven days a week 365 days a year. The police staff the position on duty 
seven days a week and respond from a standby status during off hours. All level “A” 
TLOs have a vehicle, and they respond individually. One TLO from a discipline, like the 
fire service, will arrive first at an incident command post. That first on-scene TLO has the 
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same capability and training as the TLOs from the other response TLO disciplines. The 
first on-scene TLO can begin accessing all the intelligence, information, and data that is 
available through the ACTIC.  
The Phoenix region TLOs communicate on an encrypted radio channel that is 
sponsored by the Phoenix Police Department. The 800MHz based system covers the 
majority of the 9,200 square miles of Maricopa County, which is larger than seven U.S. 
states.  
Incident commanders in jurisdictions with TLOs now rely on information and 
intelligence support provided by one of their staff who is assigned as the jurisdiction’s 
TLO. The TLOs in Arizona’s Maricopa County also have access to a secure 
communications channel. They communicate directly with TLOs from partner 
jurisdictions and the ACTIC to request and provide information, intelligence, and request 
support as incidents expand.  
The TLO can leverage the ACTIC and the resources available to them through the 
network to positively impact the incident. Furthermore, the ACTIC provides response 
TLOs with a checklist or algorithm of ticklers to ensure that the resources and data 
available to the incident commander are accessed and provided to the responders and 
investigators.  
Responder safety is one of the focuses of the TLO. Fire service TLOs can identify 
the parameters of a scene and restrict the response of fire and EMS units into the vicinity 
of the incident. As fire/EMS units are called to the vicinity of the scene, the TLO is 
notified and the public safety calls for service are de-conflicted. If the call is related to the 
incident, then the loop is closed with incident command and the decision is made how to 
safely proceed. If the call is within the perimeter of the incident but is unrelated, the TLO 
can work with the incident commander to get the fire/EMS resources in and out of the 
incident within the incident in a safe manner.  
Jurisdictions in Arizona typically use the Incident Command System (ICS) to 
address moderate and large incidents. These jurisdictions may call for incident 
management organizations to manage incidents and events that expand to include 
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multiple jurisdictions covering a large geographic area and/or requiring multiple 
operational periods. In the ICS model, the TLO is an intelligence asset to the incident 
commander and the investigations units. When a Type I, II or III incident management 
team assumes management responsibility for an incident or event, the TLOs become the 
intelligence section chief. They may be assigned to the command staff and report directly 
to the incident commander or they may fall under a general staff position like planning. 
The Phoenix Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Incident Management Team (IMT) 
uses the TLO in the intelligence liaison position on its command staff during 
deployments out of the jurisdiction and under the Intelligence Branch on the general staff 
during planned events in town.  
Incident response was the core capability that united first responders and 
demonstrated the need for a liaison officer program. Throughout the development of the 
TLO Program, the liaison officers have responded to critical incidents and provided on-
scene intelligence and information support from the fusion center. This real-time 
exchange of information that supports incident commanders builds value in the program 
daily. In addition, field operators and incident commanders become consumers of the 
TLO and fusion center information and value is built in the ACTIC and the network of 
the liaison officer program. This is a best practice of the ACTIC TLO model.  
D. STAKEHOLDERS 
The stakeholders in the TLO program have grown since its inception. Each 
stakeholder represents its jurisdiction and professional capacity. Issues faced by many 
fusion centers involve the links and relationships they have into each of the entities 
throughout our federalist system. When there is an incident outside a military post that 
the U.S. secretary of homeland security needs information on, who does the homeland 
secretary’s office call? When the local fire captain identifies a novel and unique arson 
threat that could have significant homeland security implications, who should he or she 
call? Who does the fusion center provide intelligence or informational documents to 
when the FBI or DHS (among others) create situational awareness documents concerning 
threats or special events/circumstances for public safety? How are alerts, watches, 
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warnings, and situational awareness documents distributed? The logical answer is to 
utilize the fusion center to address these information sharing requests. This raises the 
question of who, at the end-user level—the police officer, sheriff, public health, military, 
or firefighter—has the knowledge about the fusion center, its capacity, and capability and 
who knows how to supply or query necessary information from across the federalist 
landscape.  
Examples of jurisdictions that participate in the ACTIC TLO program include 
tribal law enforcement agencies, Arizona department of corrections, university police 
departments, U.S. military, border patrol, sheriffs, local firefighters, public health, local 
law enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, task force officers assigned to 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force along with railroad police and others. Each of these 
stakeholders has a professionally vested interest in keeping our nation, state, county, 
region, and community safe.  
The TLO is the mechanism and ACTIC’s member jurisdictions are the 
stakeholders involved in addressing the new, novel, and fractured components that are 
encompassed in Arizona’s homeland security efforts. The diversity of the membership is 
a best practice and is pivotal to the program’s success.  
E. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Each fusion center is responsible for creating a strategic relationship with its 
federal, state, and local partners. The role of the ACTIC TLOs is to represent their 
jurisdiction and professional capability to the ACTIC and the TLO network. One 
example includes hazardous materials incidents. Fire service partners in Arizona typically 
maintain the hazardous materials response capability. The technicians that operate on 
these calls have a specific skill set. Where does law enforcement, public health, or DHS 
engage with fire hazardous materials technicians that are addressing a criminal act with 
casualties involving the intentional use of a hazardous material? The TLOs role is to 
engage at the incident command level and unify efforts by engaging their network to 
positively impact the incident. In addition, the TLOs have access to specific CI, 
intelligence, and information that impacts many aspects of the incident. The intent of the 
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TLO Program is not to make law enforcement officers or public health professionals into 
hazardous materials technicians; rather, the intent is to create a network where the 
professional capabilities are networked to address situations where specific expertise is 
required. No single Arizona jurisdiction maintains all conceivable homeland security 
capabilities.  
The role of the TLO is to bring their professional competency into the ACTIC 
network. The TLOs’ role is to use their initiative and ability to build bridges or 
relationships between themselves and TLOs from other levels of government and 
different disciplines. The network is the strength of the program.  
Applications to become an ACTIC TLO include the endorsement by the 
applicant’s supervisor acknowledging the level of commitment and engagement that will 
be expected of the applicant. The application also includes a portion that details the level 
of commitment (A, B, C, or D—explained below) the jurisdiction and the ACTIC will 
expect of the TLO. The ACTIC, pursuant to state law, enters into an intergovernmental 
agreement with the TLO’s agency. The Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) addresses 
the purpose of the IGA, details concerning the participation and time commitment of the 
TLO, equipment, finances, and other boiler plate IGA language dealing with 
discrimination and liability.  
A level “A” TLO are assigned a package of grant funded equipment that includes 
an automobile for response, an internet capable laptop computer for information sharing, 
and a variety of other equipment to respond to incident as well as conduct threat and 
vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure and key resources. Level A TLOs are 
sponsored by the ACTIC for a federally sponsored secret security clearance, and 
successful completion of the secret security clearance investigation is a requirement for a 
level A. Additionally, the home jurisdiction of a level A TLO is required to sign a 
memorandum of understanding with the ACTIC concerning TLO equipment, roles, and 
responsibilities.  
A level “B” TLO are assigned a package of grant funded equipment that includes 
an internet capable laptop computer for information sharing and a variety of other 
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equipment to respond to incident as well as conduct threat and vulnerability assessments 
of critical infrastructure and key resources. Level B TLOs are also sponsored by the 
ACTIC for a federally sponsored secret security clearance, and successful completion of 
the secret security clearance investigation is a requirement for a level B TLO. Like for the 
A level TLO, the home jurisdiction of a level B TLO is required to sign a memorandum 
of understanding with the ACTIC concerning TLO equipment, roles, and responsibilities.  
A level “C” TLOs are be assigned an equipment package that is purchased by 
their home jurisdiction. This equipment package typically includes a computer for 
intelligence and information sharing. In addition, the package may include a variety of 
other equipment to conduct TLO operations, including threat and vulnerability 
assessments of CI.  
A level “D” TLO is an individual that a jurisdiction has sponsored to participate 
in the TLO program. The focus of this individual is the exchange of information and 
intelligence on behalf of their organization with the ACTIC.  
Each ACTIC TLO attends a 40-hour basic course. The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security approved course includes TLO roles and responsibilities, the signs of 
terrorism, domestic and international terrorism, fourth generation warfare, ACTIC 
capabilities, civil rights and liberties, intelligence products, the FBI JTTF, DHS 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), protective security advisor (PSA), criminal 
investigations research, intelligence-led policing, and suspicious activity reporting. The 
28 CFR part 23 is the Code of Federal Regulation that addresses state and local 
intelligence gathering, documenting, and retaining. The TLO course has a prerequisite 
requiring that each candidate take and pass the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Assistance on-line course called 28-CFR part 23.89  
F. ISSUES, DYNAMICS, AND CHALLENGES 
The creation of the ACTIC TLO program resulted in a number of unintended 
consequences. Some of them were disruptive. The ACTIC TLO program had many 
89 Bureau of Justice Assistance Log In to 28 CFR Part 23 Online Training National Criminal 
Intelligence Resource Centerhttps://www.ncirc.gov/28cfr/Default.aspx 
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strategic implications. When the program was conceptualized, it was opposed by a 
number of individuals. Some felt they would be yielding or making sensitive information 
available to other professions or agencies that may not have a right to see or know 
specific information. Some were concerned about reporting on incidents outside of the 
closed law enforcement community, while others did not like the political influence that 
was present in the program. In an attempt to allay the concerns, the ACTIC mandated that 
any individual who had access to sensitive information due to their assignment to the 
TLO program would be required attend training dealing with sensitive information and 
then sign a non-disclosure agreement.  
The issue concerning political influence had roots in the grants and budgets of 
some jurisdictions. Law enforcement is typically a significant percentage of a 
jurisdictions budget. In many cases, the fire service and emergency medical services are 
significant percentages also. Individually, these groups exert influence over public safety 
service and funding, and they each have considerable influence. As the TLO program 
unifies the efforts of these public safety partners to address homeland security issues at 
the local, county, and state level, the partnership it creates a highly influential group with 
significant budgetary impact. Public safety managers typically pursue the same public 
safety dollars as their partner disciplines. In the TLO arena, this is not necessary. The 
TLO Program allows managers to unify their efforts and leverage their individual budgets 
to benefit the homeland security environment.  
Many individual and agency agendas are affected by the TLO Program. The 
ACTIC and the TLO initiative can be seen as a direct threat to currently funded programs 
that focus on information sharing. Many entities create elaborate information sharing 
mechanisms that are not used. Experience has shown that many ISE initiatives are not 
used because they are developed, and then the public safety entities are engaged. Budgets 
trump collaboration. The TLO program focuses on the relationships between agencies 
and the creation of a trusted partnership.  
The TLOs collect and report information and they focus their information 
collection based on the needs of the fusion center and the intelligence community. One 
issue related to collecting information involved the definition of parameters of the 
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specific information the ACTIC needed. To address this issue the ACTIC created and 
implemented a collection plan that provided direction concerning the specific articulable 
activities that the ACTIC needed information on. Examples of the information include 
terrorism, threats to public safety, crime trends and threats to critical infrastructure, 
among others. This information can be used to generate ACTIC products like alerts, 
watches, warnings and situational awareness bulletins.  
When the ACTIC opened its doors it had an issue concerning the collection and 
maintenance of CI information. The Arizona Legislature passed a law assigning the 
responsibility for CI information and maintenance to DPS. DPS leveraged the ACTIC as 
the location where the data would be collected and secured. Each one of the CI facilities 
lies within a local, county or state jurisdiction that must respond to any and all 
emergencies at the facility. There is, or should be, an established relationship between the 
first response jurisdiction and the CI operator. The ACTIC leverages the TLOs in the 
jurisdiction to collect and conduct threat assessments. The TLOs use their TLO laptops to 
enter the data into the ACTIC’s CI data systems. At the end of the day, these critical 
infrastructure and key resources are the specific locations where public safety focuses the 
majority of our terrorism prevention activities.  
G. WEAKNESS OR FAILURE 
There are specific areas of weakness that are associated with the TLO Programs 
intelligence, prevention, and protection subprograms. There are no matrices to measure 
the effectiveness of these programs. How would one measure the fact that an incident did 
not occur? The matrices that are produced tend toward the number of outreach programs 
or how many documents are created.  
The TLO Program relies on the home jurisdiction of the TLO to ensure they are 
meeting the commitment to the program. Each jurisdiction that receives a grant funded 
level A or B TLO kit is required to sign a memorandum of agreement with the ACTIC 
that commits that the trained and equipped TLO will use the equipment to address 
ACTIC TLO issues, including information and intelligence exchange, CI protection, and 
on scene response. Public safety generally relies on a specific organizational structure to 
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address the areas for which it is responsible and accountable. The TLO Program is a 
network and does not have authority over the activities of its TLO partners. 
One consequence of the TLO Program may be the dulling of specific public 
safety operational focus. Public safety professionals are authorized and funded to 
accomplish a specific goal (e.g., law enforcement, fire, emergency medical), and each of 
these professional capabilities is unique. While they are unique, they do each need a level 
of public safety information or intelligence to keep the community and themselves safe. 
One consequence of the program may be that the professions uniqueness may be blurred, 
and individuals and managers may come to think they can fulfill some or all or the roles 
of a partner discipline. Each of the different disciplines involved in the TLO program 
support the homeland security environment to some degree. One example is the fire 
service. The number of structural fires has declined significantly over the past decades for 
reasons including the fire services efforts in fire prevention, zoning, local ordinances, and 
codes along with new building materials. However, the TLO Program offers the fire 
service the opportunity to engage in homeland security activities that fulfill their missions 
in public safety and address the future threats to their jurisdictions.  
The TLO Program has failed to bring two significant partners into the program as 
participants. Members of the FBI JTTF and DHS I&A, along with reports officers, do not 
participate as members of the TLO Program. The JTTF and the Department of Homeland 
Security I&A officers have two separate roles concerning terrorism. The FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force is in place to address many of the investigative concerns with 
which the TLOs work. The DHS I&A officer is in place to engage the homeland security 
partners and ensure they get access to the information they have the right and need to 
have access to. The FBI and I&A officer instruct portions of the TLO basic course to new 
TLOs. The roles of the FBI and the I&A officer overlap in homeland security related 
information sharing. The JTTF focuses on investigations and oriented to address specific 
cases, while the DHS’s I&A focuses on fostering an information sharing environment 
where everyone who should have information or have access to information gets that 
information or access. The TLOs actively work with both the JTTF and I&A officer 
throughout Arizona concerning their core capabilities and capabilities. The I&A officer 
 47 
and FBI sit on the ACTIC Management Board and the intelligence committee; however, 
neither FBI JTTF special agents nor the I&A officer have attended the TLO class as a 
student. Both the FBI and DHS could build value and networked partnerships throughout 
Arizona’s public safety community by attending the TLO school and becoming members 
of the network.  
H. COMMITTEES 
The ACTIC management board is the executive leadership group that addresses 
policy and budgeting of the ACTIC, including the statewide TLO program. The group is 
made up of executives from the agencies that participate in the ACTIC.  
The TLO program has a standing committee in the ACTIC management structure. 
Statewide TLO training and policy is developed and recommended at the TLO committee 
level. The TLO program also has a standing meeting twice a month. The first meeting 
addresses situational awareness, program updates, and briefings, and second addresses 
training needs of the program.  
The ACTIC also has an Intelligence Committee, which focuses on intelligence 
and information collection, analysis, and production. The TLO and Intelligence 
Committee work is implemented at the direction of the Management Board.  
The TLO Committee focuses on the statewide TLO community. The core of the 
program is the capacities and capabilities that are represented by the participants. Each 
participant must successfully complete the TLO school. The basic TLO school is 40 
hours of instruction and has been presented in different locations across the state to 
incorporate the greatest number of federal, state, local, and tribal participants. Upon 
successfully completing the school, the TLOs have the knowledge and network necessary 
operate as a FLO. They bring their own skills and ability to the network.  
The Intelligence Committee focuses its efforts on engaging the ACTIC partners to 
consolidate the information and intelligence requirements of the state and its regions. 
Annually, the Intelligence Committee surveys Arizona’s public safety community 
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concerning the priority information needs of each community that the ACTIC should 
focus on. The ACTIC survey focuses on 13 areas that the community rates as priorities.  
These priorities are incorporated into the annual ACTIC collection plan. The 
collection plan is used by TLOs, analysts, and partner jurisdictions as they address 
incidents or suspicious activity. The information is reported, collated, and entered into the 
ACTIC database. The database is compliant with the federal regulation that focuses on 
state and local intelligence gathering. Individuals may understand the concept of 
suspicious activity. The collection plan gives specifics concerning suspicious activity and 
provides a framework for partners and analysts to identify, report, collate, and document 
what the community has identified as its priorities. 
I. TLO HANDBOOK 
The ACTIC TLO handbook is a public safety sensitive document that addresses 
specific duties, responsibilities, and capabilities of the TLO and the ACTIC. The 
handbook contains algorithms with if-then guidelines for TLOs who respond to calls 
across the public safety spectrum including bomb calls, SWAT support, suspicious 
substance calls, investigative support, and methods of identifying outstanding suspects. 
The handbook is also a guide for TLOs’ as they address issues that for which the program 
is responsible. In addition, the handbook includes a phone roster, specific directions on 
intelligence, incident response, and operational security. The handbook ends with 
instructions on key items that a TLOs should consider to keep the members of their 
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IV. FUSION LIAISON OFFICER MODELS BY COMPARISON 
Fusion centers across the country have established various forms of outreach and 
liaison programs. The programs are typically called terrorism (TLO), fusion (FLO), or 
intelligence liaison officers (ILO). Among homeland security practitioners, it is often 
said, “if you have seen one fusion center then you have seen one fusion center.” This is 
especially true for fusion centers’ individual liaison and outreach programs. Centers are 
owned, operated, and funded by states and major urban areas. Each fusion center that has 
created a liaison officer program has tailored the program to the serve its unique region. 
Many liaison officer programs include participants from private sector critical 
infrastructure along with their public safety core. There is no consistency among fusion 
centers about the way they engage their constituent jurisdictions. In addition, there are no 
baseline requirements for fusion center outreach. The common thread that is universal in 
fusion center outreach through liaisons is information sharing. Members of fusion centers 
know they must fulfill the task of creating an information sharing environment within the 
governance structure they operate in; however, there are no clear standards in relation to 
fusion center liaison and outreach programs that define success.  
Each liaison officer program is unique and each fusion center trains its liaison 
officers to a different standard. Some centers provide an eight -hour basic course while 
others have a 24- to 40-hour course. Furthermore, liaison officers come from many state 
and local agencies. This creates a funding issue when the fusion center needs to address 
training. The ACTIC Program requires liaison officers to take a prerequisite course in 28 
CFR Part 23 before the first day of class. This frees up two hours of the 40-hour course 
for other important topics. Additionally, many fusion centers incorporate the 23CFR Part 
23 training in their classroom time.  
The ACTIC leverages different Department of Homeland Security Grants to fund 
the training and equipping of the liaison officers. These funds come from the Phoenix 
Urban Area Security Initiative and Arizona’s State Homeland Security Grant funds. The 
ACTIC TLO school is approved by the Department of Homeland Security so the ACTIC 
can use DHS funds to put on the course and the students can use travel funds to attend the 
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training that may be hosted in a different part of the state. To provide continuing 
education to the TLOs the ACTIC’s annual TLO conference is partially funded with the 
use of homeland security grant funds.  
This chapter will compare the ACTIC with two regional fusion centers and one 
statewide fusion center. The two regional fusion centers are the Central Florida 
Information Exchange (CFIX) and the Northern California Regional Information 
Exchange (NCRIC). The statewide fusion center is the Colorado Information and 
Analysis Center.  
A. CENTRAL FLORIDA INFORMATION EXCHANGE  
Florida is broken up into seven regional domestic security task forces. The 
Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (CFIX) represents region 5 and serves nine Florida 
counties in its region from its headquarters in Orange County. CFIX refers to their liaison 
officers as intelligence liaison officers (ILO).  
The CFIX recruits ILOs from within the law enforcement, emergency services, 
and private sector entities. Similarly to the ACTIC, the CFIX ILOs report suspicious 
activity and disseminate CFIX products between their agency and the fusion center. In 
addition, the CFIX provides training including terrorism, organized group or gang 
recognition, critical infrastructure, intelligence rules, and regulations along with reporting 
and sharing information to those ILOs who come from law enforcement, emergency 
services, and government along with private organizations, such as Disney World, Epcot 
Center, and Universal Studios. The ACTIC has one statewide TLO coordinator who deals 
primarily with the public safety participants of the program. The CFIX focuses its 
coordination efforts in two areas. One focuses on the private sector while the other 
focuses on the public sector.  
The CFIX implemented an Intelligence Liaison Officer Program with a focus on 
creating an information sharing environment based in the concepts of intelligence-led 
policing. The purpose of the CFIX ILO is to “provide local agencies within the region 
with an increased intelligence capability, and to enhance the concept of intelligence led 
policing by providing a regionally developed reporting and trend analysis capability to 
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our regional partners based upon ILO reports.”90 According to the CFIX’s ILO Concept 
of Operations 
The goal is to make our government agencies (both law enforcement and 
non-law enforcement) first preventers rather than first responders, relative 
to the increase in violent and gang related crime, major organized theft, 
terrorism and other threats to our economy, citizens and visitors.91  
The CFIX incorporates and trains public safety and private sector partners in their 
program. New public safety and private sector ILOs attend a 16-hour basic ILO course 
together, which “encourages networking and fosters the philosophy of intelligence 
sharing”92 The ACTIC focuses its training efforts across the all hazards environment. 
TLOs receive an advanced course in the current national security threat environment, 
which is complimented with training in blocks of instruction on law enforcement and fire 
service special operations (SWAT, bomb, HazMat) along with the fusion centers 
expectation when TLOs respond to expanding incidents.  
Part of the CFIX ILO program focuses on a private sector ILO program. Private 
sector ILOs are individuals at management level within their home organizations who 
would logically work with the fusion center. The private sector ILOs typically represent 
businesses that are part of the regions critical infrastructure and key resources. These 
private sector ILOs work with the emergency services and private sector coordinator at 
the CFIX. The CFIX model utilizes two coordinators to manage the programs 
participants. One coordinator works with law enforcement ILOs including police and 
sheriffs, and the other coordinator manages four sector specific coordinators who focus 
their efforts on their particular sector. These four specific sectors are fire (with 
emergency medical services), emergency management, public health, and the private 
sector. According to the Central Florida Intelligence Exchange:  
The ILO Program promotes the involvement of nominated individuals 
working in collaboration with other ILOs within the region of Central 
90 Central Florida Intelligence Exchange, Intelligence Liaison Officer Program Concept of Operations 
(Orlando, FL: Central Florida Intelligence Exchange, 2011), 3.  
91 Ibid., 3. 
92 Ibid., 8.  
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Florida through a comprehensive prevention program. This program 
provides a platform to collect and share information and plan operations in 
relation to local and state hazards, threats and criminal activity. 
Information sharing will be facilitated through a clearly defined 
architecture to promote the sharing of information critical to the 
stakeholders of Central Florida’s prevention, preparedness, and security 
efforts.93  
Similarly to the CFIX, the ACTIC considers its professional firefighters, EMS, 
public health, and emergency management partners members of the ACTIC’s public 
safety community. They are vetted by their agency and many pursue their security 
clearance as they begin participating in the program.  
However, unlike CFIX, the ACTIC does not incorporate private sector partners in 
the TLO program. Also unlike the CFIX, the ACTIC created a separate program, the 
Community Liaison Officer Program, which focuses on outreach in a collaborative effort 
along with the Phoenix FBI’s Infraguard coordinator and Arizona’s protective security 
advisor from DHS’s Protective Security Coordination Division.  
B. COLORADO INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER  
The Colorado Information and Analysis Center (CIAC) is Colorado’s fusion 
center. The CIAC refers to its liaison officers as terrorism liaison officers (TLO). The 
TLO Program in Colorado also incorporates public and private sector representatives, as 
CFIX does. The CIAC maintains a TLO coordinator who coordinates the CIAC’s 
activities with the TLOs that are spread throughout the state. According to Wolfinbarger, 
“The CIAC was designed as the State’s (Colorado) fusion center to create cross-
jurisdictional partnerships between local, state and federal agencies and to include private 
sector participants.”94 The intent is to further the information sharing efforts of the 
Department of Homeland Security, and the core capability associated with the CIAC 
TLO program is information sharing. The two way flow of information was created to 
93 Ibid., 10.  
94 Statement of James Wolfinbarger Director/Major Colorado Department of Public Safety Office of 
Preparedness and Security Colorado State Patrol Homeland Security Branch Before the Committee on 
Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
United States House of Representatives (2007), 
http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20071003133633-91688.pdf, 3. 
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share information between local, state, and federal agencies to address terrorism and 
criminal threats.  
Similarly to the ACTIC, the CIAC TLOs serve as their agencies point of contact 
and fusion point in their jurisdiction and for the CIAC concerning information collection, 
reporting, terrorism training, information dissemination, and briefings to their respective 
chains of command along with regional partners. Additionally, they are their jurisdictions 
and their regions intelligence collection point in their agency who engages with the 
CIAC. Each CIAC TLO receives training in a variety of homeland security areas, 
including handling and safeguarding sensitive information, threats, intelligence, critical 
infrastructure protection, prevention activities, and CIAC databases.95 
The CIAC TLOs are provided a list of specific target areas that the CIAC TLO 
can refer to when addressing their responsibilities. These lists are referred to as collection 
targets. Collection targets include terrorism, gangs, threat groups, various traditional and 
nontraditional organized crime groups, officer safety, threats, major incidents, and 
international incidents that have a local impact. The ACTIC refers to its collection targets 
in their annual collection plans which are similar to the CIAC’s.  
CIAC TLOs assist with threat and vulnerability assessments, which are conducted 
by a team they refer to as Rubicon. According to the Colorado Information Analysis 
Center: 
The Rubicon team is responsible for conducting full-spectrum integrated 
vulnerability assessments on Colorado’s most critical infrastructure and 
key resources (CI). The assessments include detailed on-site inspections 
that identify vulnerabilities from an all-hazards approach, such as crime, 
natural disasters, sabotage, and acts of terrorism.96  
This is similar to the ACTIC’s Threat Mitigation Unit (TMU). TMU members are TLOs 
that become specialized in conducting threat assessments and working with the public or 
private sector entity to close any threat gaps with the use of technology or fixed defenses 
to protect the infrastructure.  
95 Colorado Information Analysis Center, Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook 2008 (Denver CO: 
Colorado Information Analysis Center, 2008).  
96 Ibid.  
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The CIAC publishes a TLO handbook. Each Colorado critical infrastructure 
sector is addressed in the CIAC TLO handbook. The threat to the infrastructure is 
explained and possible indicators of tactics and techniques are delineated for the CIAC 
TLO. This CIAC TLO handbook unifies the efforts of the TLOs and the Rubicon team at 
the CIAC.  
The ACTIC’s TLO handbook is called Arizona’s Terrorism Liaison Officer Field 
Operations Guide (FOG). Each TLO is issued this pocket guide that consolidates the 
programs standard operating procedures into the FOG. The ACTIC’s FOG goes into 
detail concerning TLO roles and responsibilities, which include topics like TLO 
operations in support of incident commanders in the field and expectations and 
capabilities of TLOs at expanding incidents.  
C. NORTHERN CALIFORNIA REGIONAL INFORMATION CENTER 
The state of California is divided up between five regional information centers. 
The fusion center in northern California operating in Sacramento is called the Northern 
California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC). The NCRIC has both a terrorism 
liaison officer and infrastructure liaison officer (ILO) program. A major focus of the 
NCRIC is to enhance communication between public safety organizations and the private 
sector.  
The NCRIC TLO program incorporates homeland security related government 
agencies who engage in an information sharing environment with the fusion center. The 
NCRIC TLO “is limited to: Active Peace Officers, Firefighters, State Investigators, 
Federal Agents, Military Investigative personnel, or other government employees 
(working within the public safety /homeland security community) employed within the 
NCRIC’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).”97 NCRIC TLOs attend an introductory eight-
hour course and have access to NCRIC data and information after completing the 
NCRIC’s nondisclosure agreement.  
97 Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, “NCRIC Terrorism & Infrastructure Liaison 
Officer Programs,” 2015, https://ncric.org/default.aspx?menuitemid=629  
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The ACTIC has a similar requirement which requires each TLO to sign and 
maintain a current nondisclosure agreement. Training on civil rights, civil liberties and 
information sensitivity is part of the ACTIC’s basic 40-hour TLO school. The NCRIC 
represents northern California’s entities and falls under the state of California police 
officers standards. The statewide training standard for a basic TLO in California is the 
California eight-hour course. This can be supplemented later with other training. The 
NCRIC provides training, communication, access to official use documents, 
memberships in the DHS federally supported NCRIC website on the Homeland Security 
Information Network creating an information sharing environment between ILOs, TLOs, 
and the NCRIC.  
Similar to the ACTIC’s Community Liaison Officer Program, the NCRIC has an 
Infrastructure Liaison Officer (ILO) Program that engages the private sector who are 
members of the CI community. “The standards for membership with the Northern 
California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), Private Sector Partner Program are 
based on both a ‘right’ and a ‘need’ to know sensitive information connected to public 
safety.”98 The NCRIC staffs a private sector outreach program manager. This free 
program furthers their efforts in information sharing with their vetted private sector 
partners to meet the regions public and private sector information sharing needs.  
The NCRIC is a signatory on the (California) State Threat Assessment System, 
which demonstrates the fusion centers commitment to “Standards and Procedures for 
Maintaining Criminal Intelligence Files and Criminal Intelligence Operational 
Activities.”99 The policy addresses information collection, maintenance, sharing, and 
destruction. Additionally, it discusses the “sharing of information with those responsible 
for Public Protection, Safety, or Public Health”100 by allowing that “information retained 
by components may be disseminated to individuals in public or private entities only for 
98 Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, “Private Sector Partners,” 
https://ncric.org/(X(1)S(ckgsc04y0xmtczcgbdbrwbpy))/default.aspx?menuitemid=105&menusubid=18&m
enugroup=NCRIC+Public+Home&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 
99 Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, State Threat Assessment System, Information 
Privacy Policy, 2014, https://ncric.org/html/CaliforniaSTTASPrivacyPolicy.pdf 
100 Ibid. 
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public protection, safety, or public health purposes and only in the performance of 
official duties in accordance with applicable laws and procedures”101 The ACTIC 
maintains and trains on the privacy policy and also maintains and annually reviews a set 
of standing information needs, also known as a collection plan. The collection plan 
focuses on threats, hazards and issues. Threats include terrorism, special events, and 
some specific criminal acts that the fusion center collects information and intelligence on. 
Hazards include public health, natural events (e.g., fire, severe weather), and critical 
incident support. Issues involve strategic concerns of the partner agencies like gangs, 
weapons, narcotics, and crime trends. The ACTIC collection plan provides TLOs and 
ACTIC partners specific direction on what the fusion center is focusing its efforts and on 
what constituent entities to should report. Fusion centers can ask for liaisons or any 
reporting party to report suspicious information. Collection plans, like the ACTIC’s, 
provide direction and guidance on what is considered suspicious to the fusion center and 
also lets the reporting party know what is being collected and analyzed by the center. 
Table 2 shows some comparisons between the four liaison officer programs. 
Table 2.   Liaison Officer Programs by Comparison 
Liaison Officer Program Capabilities  ACTIC NCRIC CFIX CIAC 
Information Sharing and Exchange √ √ √ √ 
On Scene Response √    
Threat and Vulnerability Assessments √   assist 
Basic Liaison Officer Course 40 
Hours 




101 Ibid., 11. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Fusion centers pursue their individual goals and objectives. These goals and 
objectives may be addressed by taking one, two, or all three of the capacities of the 
ACTIC TLO program and using it as a conceptual model to replicate in part or as a whole 
to meet their needs. Nationally, fusion centers should move toward establishing a 
consistent and institutionalized relationship between the fusion center and its constituent 
agencies. There are models, including the models previously addressed in this thesis, 
from which urban areas and state fusion centers can take smart practices and then tailor 
their liaison officer program to meet the needs of the participant jurisdiction, the fusion 
center, and the federal government. These fusion center’s state and local partners may be 
members of public safety, members of the military, emergency management, or members 
of the private sector. The capacity and capability of the liaison officer is only limited by 
the fusion centers commitment to expand on a baseline of capabilities to make the 
community safer.  
The ACTIC TLO program unifies three separate capabilities. These capabilities 
are information and intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection, and on scene 
response. These specific capabilities continue to support the ACTIC and its partner 
jurisdictions as they address significant incidents across Arizona.  
I recommend that the Fusion Center Guidelines broadly define a liaison officer 
program as a necessary component in state and major area fusion centers. This broad 
definition should mandate an information sharing network between the fusion center and 
its constituent entities, including partners from the public and private sector. I further 
recommend that the baseline capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers be 
modified to make a liaison officer program a necessary component of achieving the 
baseline capabilities of a fusion center as assessed by the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
Communities in the United States face a new generation of issues that must be 
addressed by their component agencies across the federalist landscape. The issues of 
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response, critical infrastructure, and trusted partnerships fall under an umbrella we now 
call homeland security. Addressing homeland security requires collaboration. 
Collaboration does not happen by accident. Hoping for collaboration at the scene of an 
incident is not a plan. If the word “hope” enters into a plan then there is no plan, there is 
simply hope.  
The ACTIC TLO program has institutionalized public safety relationships. It has 
fostered a trusted partner relationship between individuals and their agencies that do not 
typically engage each other, other than at the scene of an extraordinary event. The 
ACTIC has been the unique environment that has allowed the distinctive network to have 
been created and matured.  
The TLO program began with a concept and a core group of individuals who took 
the initiative and focused on the new generation of homeland security issues in Arizona. 
The ACTIC TLO model addresses many critical capabilities that are required of today’s 
fusion centers and may be a concept that other fusion centers can consider when as they 
attempt to build their capacity and capability to meet the needs of the homeland security 
enterprise. 
Fusion centers across the country look to the ACTIC, the CIAC, the CFIX, and 
the NCRIC as examples of how multi layered and multijurisdictional relationships can be 
leveraged into a comprehensive and complex environment. These liaisons institutionalize 
a relationship between their agency, department, or entity with their fusion center. These 
programs are examples of how fusion centers have created their information sharing 
environments. The next step is to unify these efforts across the fusion center landscape.  
The Department of Homeland security should add the requirement of a 
comprehensive liaison officer program to the fusion center baseline capabilities of each 
fusion that the Department of Homeland Security recognizes. This comprehensive 
program can be tailored to the needs of each of the fusion centers but at its core should 
have public safety representation from law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical, 
and public health. Fusion centers can add capabilities like conducting critical 
infrastructure assessments, responding to incidents, information collection, and others to 
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their program as they deem necessary. The key is institutionalizing the fusion centers 
relationships with their constituent partners thus ensuring information sharing.  
DHS and the Department of Justice published the Fusion Center Guidelines in 
2006,102 and they published Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers in 2008.103 The documents focus on fusion centers achieving “baseline 
level of capability…”104 Each document provides a vision of the elements that a fusion 
center should possess. There is little specific direction on how to achieve the vision. The 
ACTIC TLO Program embodies a majority of the envisioned capabilities listed in both 
documents.  
The TLO Program addresses each of the following fusion center baseline 
capabilities for the ACTIC.  
1. Intrastate Coordination—In developing and implementing all Fusion 
Process related plans and procedures, the center shall coordinate with 
other fusion centers (the designated state fusion center and/or any UASI 
fusion center(s)) within its state to identify the roles and responsibilities of 
each center in carrying out the Fusion Process (gathering, processing, 
analyzing, and disseminating of terrorism, homeland security, and law 
enforcement information) on a statewide basis.105 
Participation in the TLO Program prevents jurisdictions from having to create 
their own fusion center. In addition, the TLOs from the states jurisdictions are trained and 
equipped the same. 
2. Risk Assessment—Fusion centers shall conduct or contribute to a 
statewide and/ or regional risk assessment that identifies and prioritizes 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences at regular intervals.106 
The TLOs are the trained and equipped professionals at fusion centers that 
conduct the assessments. The TLOs can use a computer that is linked with the ACTIC to 
enter the assessment into the current DHS system, and the TLOs can access the 
102 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. Fusion Center Guidelines, 3. 
103 DHS, and DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities.  
104 Ibid., 10.  
105 Ibid., 12.  
106 Ibid.  
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assessment for incident commanders who respond to incidents where the assessment has 
been completed.  
3. Information Requirements—The information requirements for the 
fusion center shall be defined, documented, updated regularly, and 
consistent with the center’s goals and objectives as defined by the 
governance structure and reflect the risks identified in the statewide and/or 
regional risk assessment107 
The TLOs are some of the contributors and agency representatives who are 
queried and surveyed on the risks and who provide the data concerning the risk 
assessment. The TLOs in Arizona are their jurisdictions representative to the ACTIC. The 
ACTIC conducts annual surveys on goals, priorities, and objectives of the fusion center. 
The fusion center, including the TLOs work with the DHS protective security advisor, 
reports officer, intelligence and analysis officer, and the FBI concerning statewide and 
regional threats including border related issues, special event and critical infrastructure.  
4. Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)—Fusion centers shall develop, 
implement, and maintain a plan to support the establishment of a 
suspicious activity and incident reporting process for their geographic area 
of responsibility, in a manner consistent with the Findings and 
Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and 
Implementation Project. Specifically, centers shall have the ability to 
receive, process, document, analyze, and share SARs in a manner that 
complies with the ISE-SAR Functional Standard.108 
The TLO are the operators and trainers for this program. They enter the SAR data 
or direct reporting parties to the data entry mechanism. In addition, TLOs respond to 
incidents and provide real time verifiable and credible information concerning active 
incidents in their respective jurisdictions. 
5. Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications—Fusion centers shall ensure that 
alerts, warnings, and notifications are disseminated, as appropriate, to 
state, local, and tribal authorities; the private sector; and the general 
public.109 
107 Ibid., 13. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid., 14.  
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The TLOs provide the mechanism where each member jurisdiction has a 
responsible party for accepting, reviewing, and addressing alerts, warnings, and 
notifications on behalf of their jurisdiction. The ACTIC relies on the TLOs to provide the 
statewide information sharing environment.  
6. Situational Awareness Reporting—Fusion centers shall develop 
processes to manage the reporting to key officials and the public of 
information regarding significant events (local, regional, national, and 
international) that may influence state or local security conditions.110 
TLOs are responsible and accountable to their home jurisdiction first, and they 
have an additional duty of engaging the fusion center concerning exceptional and special 
circumstances. The TLOs are also the professionals within an organization that the fusion 
center can reach out to and glean timely, credible, and accurate information. In addition, 
the TLO is the fusion center network that the ACTIC uses. A responsible party in each 
ACTIC partner jurisdiction across the state has been identified, trained, and vetted for 
this purpose.  
7. Data Sources—Fusion centers shall identify and document data sources 
and repositories needed to conduct analysis based on the mission of the 
center, the findings of the Risk Assessment, and the center’s defined 
Information Requirements.111 
TLOs are the operators who have access to this data in repositories for their 
agencies across the state. The ACTIC has many data driven responsibilities, including 
facial recognition, INTERPOL center for Arizona, DHS risk assessments, special event 
threat mitigation video capabilities, and more.  
The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office operates the facial recognition capability at 
the ACTIC. When there is a photograph of a suspect, the facial recognition unit can query 
the picture against millions of known images from a variety of databases. TLOs can 
leverage this capability when responding to incidents where suspects or victims are 





                                                 
8. Coordination With Response and Recovery Officials—Fusion centers 
shall identify and coordinate with emergency managers and appropriate 
response and recovery personnel and operations centers to develop, 
implement, and maintain a plan and procedures to ensure a common 
understanding of roles and responsibilities and to ensure that intelligence 
and analysis capabilities can be leveraged to support emergency 
management operation activities, as appropriate, when events require such 
a response.112  
TLOs respond to moderate and large scale (Tier I, II and III) incidents, and they 
provide a scalable asset that can be expanded to include missions supporting incident 
commanders on expanding incidents and emergency managers during mitigation and 
recovery efforts. National level exercise TOPOFF4 yielded a recommendation that TLOs 
be dispatched to EOCs in the affected jurisdictions along with the affected county and 
state EOC to facilitate information sharing and provide decision makers the intelligence 
and information that is necessary to respond to, address, mitigate, and recover from 
critical incidents.  
9. Coordination With Private Sector and Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources (CI) Information Sharing—Fusion centers, in partnership with 
locally based federal authorities, shall develop, implement, and maintain a 
plan and procedures for sharing information with owners of CI and, in 
general, the private sector, in a coordinated manner.113 
TLOs are the ACTIC’s outreach to CI. They engage CI from the perspective of 
the local jurisdiction and the ACTIC. The TLOs work with the DHS protective security 
advisor to ensure there is a bridge between the national level governmental partners and 
the critical infrastructure partners that reside in the TLOs jurisdiction. 
10. Exercises—Fusion centers should conduct or participate in another agency’s 
scenario-based tabletop and live training exercises to regularly assess their 
capabilities.114 
TLOs are operational assets assigned by their community as liaisons to the fusion 
center. Many are automatically dispatched to a standard list of calls and are requested to 
support any variety of incidents. They are actively engaged in the training and exercises 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 15. 
114 Ibid. 
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within their jurisdictions and are critical components of regional, statewide, and national 
level exercises, such as TOPOFF4, Coyote Crisis, Vigilant Guard for example. The TLOs 
provide the link between the incident management team, the fusion center, and the 
participating jurisdiction. 
TLOs address many of the baselines concerning “information gathering/collection 
and recognition of indicators and warnings.”115  
1. Information-Gathering and Reporting Strategy—Fusion centers shall 
develop, implement, and maintain an information gathering and -reporting 
strategy that leverages existing capabilities and shall identify methods for 
communicating information requirements and the overall information-
gathering strategy to partners, to include any applicable fusion liaison 
officers. 
The TLOs are the backbone of this capability in Arizona, and they are provided 
the training and equipment to fulfill this role. Furthermore, TLOs respond to calls, report 
tips, and leads to the national suspicious activity reporting initiative and to the FBI 
through a system called e-Guardian. Moreover, the TLOs have a number of reporting 
mechanisms by which the reports can be made—through a web portal, by phone, or 
directly entered into the system with the use of a computer.  
2. Feedback Mechanism—Fusion centers shall define and implement a feedback 
mechanism116 
The TLO Program is the method that provides engagement and feedback from the 
jurisdiction and from the ACTIC. Survey is a mechanism that is used by the ACTIC. 
TLOs and other consumers are given the opportunity to address issues or concerns about 
ACTIC publications with the use of a survey tool that is hyperlinked to the end of each 
ACTIC intelligence publication. The ACTIC also conducts annual surveys of the TLOs 
for feedback and input concerning ongoing programs and future initiatives. The TLO 
Program hosts an annual conference where issues are addressed and relevant training is 
provided to address issues identified as the program receives feedback.  
115 Ibid., 16. 
116 Ibid.  
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3. Collection and Storage of Information—Fusion centers shall define the policies 
and processes and establish a mechanism for receiving, cataloging, and retaining 
information provided to the center.117 
TLOs are signatories of non-disclosure agreements and are trained in the proper use of 
the collection and storage mechanisms of the ACTIC.  
TLOs address many of the baselines concerning “process and collation of 
information.”118 
Information Collation—Fusion center analysts shall use the necessary and 
available tools to process and collate information and intelligence to assist 
with accurate and timely analysis.119 
The TLOs provide the ACTIC analysts the capability to engage and collect 
information from jurisdictional databases across the state through the use of a trusted 
network. 
2. Levels of Confidence—Fusion centers shall liaise with partners to 
ensure that information collected is relevant, valid, and reliable.120 
This is the intent of the TLO Program. Real-time, verifiable, and actionable 
information is exchanged throughout the state by the ACTIC and its TLOs.  
TLOs address many of the baselines concerning “intelligence/information 
dissemination.”121 
1. Dissemination Plan—Fusion centers shall develop a high-level 
dissemination plan that documents the procedures and communication 
mechanisms for the timely dissemination of the center’s various products 
to the core and ad hoc customers.122 
The TLOs are a core capability for the fusion center and within a jurisdiction for 
dissemination. The TLO Program provides a vetted group of public safety partners across 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., 17.  
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 18. 
122 Ibid.  
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Arizona. Each law enforcement agency, professional fire department, and sheriff’s office 
has at least one and in most case many points of contact who are trained TLOs. One of 
the core missions that these individuals are trained in involves being their agencies point 
of contact for fusion center products. Furthermore, the TLOs responsibilities include 
digesting the fusion center products and further disseminating them to the operators and 
managers who require the information.  
2. Reporting of Information to Other Centers—Fusion centers shall 
develop the processes and protocols for ensuring that relevant and vetted 
priority information is reported to fusion centers in other states and 
localities to support regional trends analysis.123 
The TLO program is the mechanism that the ACTIC uses to identify relevant 
information and vet out priority information concerning incidents and events throughout 
Arizona. This information is translated into situational awareness bulletins, officer 
awareness bulletins, and similar documents for distribution to states, localities, and it 
supports regional trend analysis.  
The ACTIC has a watch center that is staffed by ACTIC intelligence analysts and 
representatives from the partner agencies. The Watch Center is the hub for suspicious 
activity reporting in the state. Calls are answered 24 hours a day, seven days a week by 
ACTIC staff or the DPS duty officer. Suspicious activity reporting is documented in a 
database and the information is entered or forwarded to the appropriate federal state or 
local database. Examples of these databases include the DHS National Suspicious 
Activity Reporting database and the FBI e-Guardian system. As TLOs respond to 
incidents across Arizona, they notify and update the watch center of incidents. As 
incidents arise in jurisdictions, the watch center can contact the TLO and get a situational 
awareness briefing that can be shared with decision makers. As incidents expand, TLOs 
can work through the Watch Center to request ACTIC data (intelligence and information) 
and capabilities like HazMat, facial recognition, and computer forensics to name a few.  
One example of the watch center’s roles includes the method Arizona agencies 
use to address suspicious substances. Since the anthrax incidents of 2001 there have been 
123 Ibid.  
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public safety protocols in place in Arizona. The suspicious substance protocol addresses 
anthrax, ricin, or other suspicious substance calls for service across the state. The Arizona 
plan has matured over time. Incident responders determine if a suspicious substance is a 
possible threat or otherwise requires analysis by the state laboratory known as the 
Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The hazardous materials team members that are 
typically TLOs take possession of the substance and notify the watch center that they will 
be transporting the evidence to the LRN. The watch center provides a number specific 
tracking to the evidence. The law enforcement chain of custody is established concerning 
the item, which will be important for prosecution if the case is determined to be a 
criminal act. The LRN then notifies the watch center of the results of the tests. The watch 
center makes notifications to the partner jurisdictions.  
3. Reporting of Information to Federal Partners—Fusion centers shall 
develop the processes and protocols, in coordination with the FBI and 
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), for ensuring that relevant 
and vetted priority information is reported to the JTTF and other 
appropriate federal agencies to support its inclusion into national patterns 
and trends analysis.124 
The TLOs report their jurisdictions SARs through the ACTIC. Additionally, the 
TLOs responsibility is to engage as their agencies representative to the ACTIC. TLOs in 
jurisdictions have federally-sponsored security clearances and can be briefed on cases on 
behalf of a jurisdiction or may be leveraged to support operations where participants need 
to be cleared. Tips and leads that are reported by the individual jurisdictions to the 
ACTIC are also entered into the FBI’s e-Guardian system for accountability and follow 
up by the JTTF. Furthermore, the FBI and the JTTF use the ACTIC and the TLO 
program to distribute their regionally specific documents to the regions law enforcement 
and public safety agencies.  
TLOs address many of the baselines concerning “reevaluation.”125  
124 Ibid., 19.  
125 Ibid., 21.  
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Performance Evaluation—Fusion centers shall develop and implement a 
plan to reevaluate the center’s performance of the intelligence cycle on a 
regular basis.126 
TLOs participate in a yearly ACTIC survey concerning intelligence, the collection 
plan, and the priorities of the ACTIC. Also, the TLO coordinator has a permanent seat on 
the ACTIC Intelligence subcommittee and participates in leveraging the TLOs to identify 
the information needs of their specific communities. When the specific needs of the 
partner jurisdictions change, the collection plan is changed to meet those needs. As 
members of the Intelligence Committee, the TLOs use a survey tool to reevaluate the 
intelligence cycle.  
TLOs address many of the baselines concerning “management and administrative 
capabilities”127   
1. Governance Structure—Fusion centers shall have a governance 
structure that provides appropriate representation for the jurisdictions and 
disciplines in the center’s area of responsibility.128 
The TLO program is the mechanism where individual jurisdictions engage with 
the fusion center. The jurisdiction is represented to the fusion center, and conversely, the 
fusion center is represented to the jurisdiction. Participating TLO jurisdictions have seats 
on the managing and executive boards of the ACTIC.  
Mission Statement—Fusion centers shall have a defined mission statement 
that is clear and concise and conveys the purpose, priority, and roles of the 
center.129 
According to Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center:  
The mission of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is to 
protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing 
and coordinating counter terrorism intelligence and other investigative 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 23.  
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid., 24.  
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support efforts among local, state and federal law enforcement 
agencies.130  
3. Collaborative Environment—Fusion centers shall identify the 
organizations that represent their core (permanent) and ad hoc 
stakeholders and the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder and 
develop mechanisms and processes to facilitate a collaborative 
environment with these stakeholders.131 
The TLO program is the embodiment of this collaborative environment. It is the 
mechanism where jurisdictions can engage with the fusion center, public safety, critical 
infrastructure, and community partners to achieve the ACTICs mission. 
4. Policies and Procedures Manual—Fusion centers shall develop a 
policies and procedures manual for center operations.132 
The TLO program is incorporated into the ACTICs policies and the TLO Program 
maintains TLO training manual, TLO standing operating procedures, and TLO operations 
handbook for its participants.  
5. Center Performance—Fusion centers shall define expectations, measure 
performance, and determine effectiveness of their operations.133 
The TLO program supports this endeavor. Measuring expectations, performance 
measures and effectiveness of terrorism and crime prevention efforts is complex. The 
TLOs’ activities provide for much of the measurable activity of the fusion center. Their 
performance measures include SAR documentation, e-Guardian entries, and subject 
matter expertise in critical areas.  
Suspicious activity reporting by the community, public safety partners, and TLO 
partners exists at the ACTIC. The current system is an off the shelf product that had 
originally been built in support of the Silent Witness system. The ACTIC systems used to 
take in, document and assign suspicious activity reports have changed a number of times 
130 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, “Mission / Vision,” 2004, 
http://www.azactic.gov/About/Mission_Vision/ 2004 
131 DHS, and DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities, 26. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid.  
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since the ACTIC opened. When a suspicious activity report comes into the ACTIC it 
goes to the Watch Center. The Watch Center has contact with a TLO in each of the state 
highway patrol districts, each county sheriff’s office and many police, fire, and EMS 
departments across the state.  
6. Outreach—Fusion centers shall establish a policy to govern official outreach 
and communications with leaders and policymakers, the public sector, the private 
sector, the media, and citizens and develop a plan to enhance awareness of the 
fusion center’s purpose, mission, and functions.134 
The individual TLO is the face of the ACTIC in each home jurisdiction, with their 
home critical infrastructure and among the response community. The ACTIC houses 
Arizona’s Community Liaison Officer Program (CLP). The mission of the CLP is to:  
provide a direct link between the state Counter Terrorism Center and the 
citizens, business community, and Tribal Nations in Arizona. Establishing 
and enhancing intelligence gathering and dissemination by any and all 
means available will make Arizona the safest and most prepared state in 
the nation.135 
The Community Liaison Program (CLP) provides a link between Arizona’s 
citizens, business, and tribal nations and the ACTIC. CLP’s purpose is to make Arizona 
the most prepared state in the nation through information gathering and dissemination.136 
The ACTIC has a fulltime community liaison program (CLP) officer, assigned 
from one of the ACTIC partner agencies, who manages the program and the ACTIC 
community outreach. The CLP officer is a graduate of the TLO basic school and presents 
the program to each basic TLO training session. This partnership incorporates a number 
of governmental agencies to unify community liaison initiatives, reduce duplication of 
effort, and increase membership. The unified program is called Arizona Partners for 
Arizona’s Safety and Security (AZ PASS).  
The ACTIC participates in AZ PASS along with the state’s department of 
emergency management, Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix FBI Infraguard, 
134 Ibid., 26.  
135 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, “Community Liaison Program (CLP),” 2015, 
http://www.azactic.gov/Community_Liaison/ 
136 Ibid.  
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and private sector partners to foster an information sharing environment with 
participating businesses. PASS members are invited to participate in ACTIC programs 
concerning their particular critical infrastructure sector. The analysts at the ACTIC create 
products specifically for the AZ PASS community. These documents provide AZ PASS 
partners situational awareness and analysis on how trends may affect their community. 
Examples of AZ PASS situational awareness documents include computer hacking of the 
hospitality community or mass transit and public transportation security awareness.137  
The TLO Program specifically addresses each of the following Fusion Center 
Guidelines for the ACTIC as published by DHS, DOJ, and the Global Information 
Sharing Initiative: 
1. Adhere to the tenets contained in the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (NCISP) and other sector-specific information sharing plans, 
and perform all steps of the intelligence and fusion processes. 
2. Collaboratively develop and embrace a mission statement, and identify 
goals for the fusion center. 
3. Create a representative governance structure that includes law 
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector.  
4. Create a collaborative environment for the sharing of intelligence and 
information among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement 
agencies, public safety agencies, and the private sector. 
5. Utilize Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Non-Disclosure 
Agreements (NDAs), or other types of agency agreements, as appropriate. 
6. Leverage the databases, systems, and networks available via participating 
entities to maximize information sharing. 
7. Create an environment in which participants seamlessly communicate by 
leveraging existing systems and those currently under development, and 
allow for future connectivity to other local, state, tribal, and federal 
systems. 
8. Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy.  
9. Ensure appropriate security measures are in place for the facility, data, and 
personnel.  
10. Integrate technology, systems, and people. 
137 Ibid.  
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11. Achieve a diversified representation of personnel based on the needs and 
functions of the center. 
12. Ensure personnel are properly trained. 
13. Provide a multitiereed awareness and educational program to implement 
intelligence-led policing and the development and sharing of information. 
14. Offer a variety of intelligence services and products to customers. 
15. Develop, publish, and adhere to a policies and procedures manual. 
16. Define expectations, measure performance, and determine effectiveness. 
17. Establish and maintain the center based on funding availability and 
sustainability. 
18. Develop and implement a communications plan among fusion center 
personnel; all law enforcement, public safety, and private sector agencies 
and entities involved; and the general public.138 
A comprehensive TLO program fulfills many baseline capabilities for a fusion 
center, and it institutionalizes the relationships between the fusion center and its 
constituent agencies by satisfying many of the elements that make up the fusion center 
guidelines.139 A comprehensive TLO program should be a requirement for any 
recognized state or major urban area fusion center that is recognized by the Department 
of Homeland Security.  
 
 
138 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. Fusion Center Guidelines, 5–7.  
139 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. Fusion Center Guidelines; DHS, and DOJ Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities. 
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